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What Are We-Laborers, Factories, or Spare
Parts? The Tax Treatment of Transfers of
Human Body Materials
Lisa Milot*
Abstract
Transfers of human body materials are ubiquitous. From surrogacy
arrangements, to sales of eggs, sperm and plasma to clinics, to black
markets for kidneys, to pleas for donations of body materials, these
transfers are covered and debated daily in popular and academic
discourse. The associated philosophical and legal issues have been
explored by a wide range of commentators. The appropriatetax treatment
of these transactions,however, is mostly unexamined.
Current law is unclear about what the tax consequences of these
transfers are. There are no statutory provisions directly on point, Internal
Revenue Service guidance is outdated and conflicting, and the small
number of judicial decisions in this area are narrowly written to resolve
only the tax liability of the particulartaxpayer before the court. Moreover,
there are only afew academicpublications on this topic, of which the most
comprehensive is a 1973 student Note.
This lack of legal clarity reflects in part the complexity of the issues
involved Transfers of human body materials raise questions as to the
appropriate tax treatment across multiple federal tax regimes, each of
which is governed by a distinct set of rules and informed by different
considerations of tax policy and history. Moreover, these tax issues are
arising in the context of evolving jurisprudence involving human bodies
more generally, and they implicate complex philosophicalproblems. Of
particular significance in this debate is whether human bodies can only
*
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provide services, or if their materials can constitute property of the person
from whose body they come: Whether the human body is exclusively a
laborer,or if it can also be a factory or a collection of spare parts. What is
more, the technology that has enabled these transfers continues to evolve
rapidly, increasing the demandfor human body materials and creating new
marketsfor which no well-defined regulatoryframeworks exist.
In this Article, I offer a comprehensive methodology for handling the
taxation of transfers of human body materials. To this end, I offer three
principlesfor characterizinghuman body materialsfor tax purposes. This
approachproduces a workable set of doctrines that is consonant with our
broader cultural and legal understandings, which I then apply to recurring
forms of transfers of human body materials to illustrate the resulting tax
treatment of these transfers.
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I. Introduction
Transfers of human body materials are ubiquitous. Details about them
appear daily in the popular press, and scholars regularly debate the ethical
questions they present. These transfers can (and do) take many forms. For
example, consider:
* Military wives serving as paid surrogate mothers while their
husbands are deployed abroad;'
* Ivy League women selling their eggs for upwards of $50,000;2
* Sales of kidneys for $20,000;3

1. Lorraine Ali, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2008,
http://www.newsweek.comn/id/129594 (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
2. Martha Frase-Blunt, Ova-Compensating?: Women Who Donate Eggs to Infertile
Couples Earn a Reward-But Pay a Price, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2001, at FOl1.
3. Drew Griffin & David Fitzpatrick, DonorSays He Got Thousandsfor His Kidney,
CNN.com, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.cnnmcom/2009/WORLD/meast/09/01/blackmarket.
organs/index.html?iref--storysearch (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (on file with the Washington
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" Semi-weekly sales of plasma yielding an annual income of

$75,000;4
"

Donation of a pint of blood or a kidney to a charitable
organization;

"

A woman providing an egg for her sister's use in in vitro
fertilization;

"

A taxi driver donating his kidney to a passenger who is on the
verge of kidney failure; 5 and

"

The harvesting of corneas and
other body materials from
6
cadavers for commercial resale.

These transfers raise many questions: How should we allocate these scarce
resources? Should we allow payment for them? Does allowing these
transactions devalue human life? Who is the "mother" and who is the
"father" of a child conceived as a result of surrogacy or egg or sperm
donation? Should we enforce contracts in which the subject matter is
human body materials? If so, is it appropriate to order specific performance
of these contracts? These issues, which have both philosophical and legal
dimensions, have inspired examination by a wide range of commentators.
Examination of the appropriate tax treatment of these transactions,
however, is all but nonexistent.
All transfers of human body materials have potential federal tax
consequences. Is there taxable income when a person sells an egg, a
kidney, or blood plasma? If so, are the proceeds ordinary income or capital
gains? 7 If capital gains, does the income represent long-term capital gains
eligible for preferential tax rates, or short-term capital gains taxed at the
same rate as ordinary income? 8 When, if ever, is the income subject to
and Lee Law Review).
4. See United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 94 n.1I (5th Cir. 1979) (deciding the tax
treatment of income from plasma sales of approximately $70,000 to $90,000 per year).
5. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Arizona Woman Finds Taxi Driver Is a Kidney Match,
MSNBC, Aug. 25, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/32541245/ns/us-news-wonderful_
worldl?gtl=4300 1 (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
6. Man Jailed over LA Body Parts Scheme, ABC NEWS, June 12, 2009,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/06/12/2596444.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2010)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
7. See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text (discussing the characterization of
income as ordinary or capital gain).
8. See infra notes 59--64 and accompanying text (discussing the tax treatment of
capital gains).
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payroll taxes? Should a taxpayer who donates blood or a kidney to a
charitable organization receive a tax deduction?' 0 Is the gratuitous transfer
of a kidney for transplantation subject to gift tax like a gift of a car or a
home?" Should the market value of all human body materials in a single
cadaver-estimated at $220,000 2 -be included when calculating the value
3
of a decedent's gross estate?'1
Under current law, the answers to these questions are unclear. There
are no statutory provisions on point, and the available guidance from the
Internal Revenue Service (the I.R.S. or Service) is conflicting'14 and
outdated.'" There are only a small number of judicial decisions in this area,
and each is narrowly written to resolve only the tax liability of the
particular taxpayer before the court.'16 Academic commentary on these
matters is also thin: Only a handful of publications on the tax treatment of

9. Payroll taxes consist of social security and Medicare taxes. They are due on
employee and nonemployee compensation received by a taxpayer. See infra notes 69-71
and accompanying text (discussing payroll tax provisions).
10. See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing tax deductions for
charitable contributions).
11. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text (discussing gift tax provisions).
12. See MICHELLE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY
PARTS 178 (2006) (estimating the value of all usable human body materials if they were
harvested and sold at secondary market prices at $220,000).
13. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (discussing estate tax provisions).
14. Compare Rev. Rul. 162 (Revenue Ruling 162), 1953-2 C.B. 127 ("Furnishing
blood for a transfuision, or to a blood bank, is analogous to the rendering of a personal
service by the donor rather than a contribution of 'property."'), with I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 31817 A-634712 (Oct. 26, 1960) (G.C.M. 31817) (recognizing that blood is
undoubtedly property). Because a revenue ruling is a formal declaration of the Services
position on a legal issue that may be cited and relied upon by taxpayers while a general
counsel memorandum is an internal I.R.S. document that provides the legal basis and
rationale for a ruling by the Service which may not be relied upon or cited in defense of a tax
position, Revenue Ruling 162 remains the Service's official statement of its position despite
its later declaration to the contrary. As discussed in this Article, see infra notes 52-87 and
accompanying text, the characterization of a body material as a service or as property
critically changes its tax treatment.
15. The Service's only binding statement of its position is contained in Revenue
Ruling 162, which was published in 1953. See Rev. Rul. 162, supra note 14, at C.B. 127.
Its most recent statement on point is from 1987. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8814010 (Dec. 30,
1987). A private letter ruling is a statement of the Service's position with respect to a legal
issue presented by a taxpayer and may only be relied upon and cited by the taxpayer that
requested the ruling.
16. See infra notes 101-33 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial decisions
on the tax treatment of transfers of human body materials).
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transfers of human body materials exist, 17and the most comprehensive is a
8
1973 student Note.'1
This lack of legal clarity in this area reflects in part the complexity of
the issues involved. Transfers of human body materials raise questions as
to the appropriate tax treatment across multiple federal tax regimesincome, payroll, gift, and estate.'19 Each of these tax systems is governed by
a distinct set of rules and informed by different considerations of tax policy
and history. Moreover, these tax issues are arising in the context of
evolving jurisprudence involving human bodies more generally, and they
implicate complex philosophical problems.2 Of particular significance in
this debate is whether human bodies can only provide services, or if their
materials can constitute property of the person from whose body they come:
whether the human body is exclusively a laborer, or if it can also be a
factory or a collection of spare parts. What is more, the technology that has
enabled these transfers continues to evolve rapidly, increasing the demand
for human body materials and creating new markets for which no well21
defined regulatory frameworks exist.

In this Article, I offer a comprehensive methodology for handling the
taxation of transfers of human body materials. In my view, both the history
and intensity of the current debate, as well as the dual nature of humans as
legal subjects and the object of markets, foreclose any simple approach to
these problems-particularly an approach founded on a categorical view
that human body materials are or are not uniformly property. Instead, the
context in which the transfer of a material occurs must be considered. By
embracing this underlying complexity, a nuanced framework for the
appropriate tax treatment of human body materials can be developed.
To this end, I offer principles for characterizing human body materials
for tax purposes. First, transfers involving living intact bodies, as with
surrogacy, are separated from those involving excised body materials or
17. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (discussing the limited scholarship
on tax treatment of transfers of human body materials).
18, See generally Note, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 842 (1973), discussed infra notes 138, 206, 240.
19. See infra notes 52-85 and accompanying text (providing an overview of each of
these tax systems). While there are potential state and local tax consequences as well
complicating the analysis, this Article discusses only the federal tax treatment of these
transactions.
20. See infra notes 144-74 and accompanying text (discussing the uneven treatment of
human bodies as comprising legal actors and as legal property).
21. See infra notes 175-81 and accompanying text (discussing the new and evolving
markets for human body materials).
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cadavers. Second, commercial transactions in body materials excised from
a living being, as when eggs are sold to a clinic, are distinguished from
gratuitous transfers of the same materials, like the transfer of eggs to an
infertile sister. Finally, cadavers disposed of in traditional ways, such as by
burial or cremation, and the posthumous gratuitous transfer of their
constituent materials are differentiated from those transferred in
commercial transactions. This approach produces a workable set of
doctrines that is consonant with our broader cultural and legal
understandings, which I then apply to recurring forms of transfers of human
body materials to illustrate the resulting tax treatment of these transfers.
Part II of this Article discusses the nature and scope of the problem,
highlighting the growing importance of the tax questions posed by the
transfer of human body materials. Part III analyzes and critiques current
tax jurisprudence concerning these transfers. Part IV locates these issues
within the larger legal and philosophical contexts in which they arise,
focusing, in particular, on the debate over whether human body materials
are properly characterized as property and how that characterization bears
on tax law issues. Finally, Part V sets forth my proposed tax framework.
II. The Burgeoning Problem of the Taxation of Human Body Materials
Historically, potential taxable transactions in human body materials
were limited in number and value. The first civilian blood drive was
organized to provide blood and plasma for transfusions during World War
11,2 and one of the three court cases concerning the proper tax treatment of
transfers of a human body material, decided in 1985, concerned just one
pint of blood.2 While sales of organs for transplantation have been banned
in the United States since the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) was
passed in 1984,4 in the last twenty years vibrant markets have developed
22.

See Red Gold:

The

Epic Story of

Blood,

PBS.ORG,

http://www.pbs.orgl

wnet/redgold/histoy/timeline4.htm1I (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. See infra notes I111, 127-29, 195 (discussing Lary v. United States, 608 F. Supp.
258, 263 (N.D. Ala. 1985)).
24. See National Organ Transplantation Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C. § 273 (2006) (limiting
the availability of organs for transplantation to qualified nonprofit organ procurement
organizations). Iran is the only country in which the sale of organs is legal. See Jeneen
Interlandi, Not Just Urban Legend, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 2009, http://www.news
week.com/id/1 78873 (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (discussing the worldwide problem of
organ trafficking and its increased occurrence in the United States) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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for blood products,2 sperm and eggs, and, to a lesser extent, human hair.
Individuals selling plasma generally receive $15-$25 per bleed and can
effectuate transfers as often as twice each week.2 Typical sperm sales,
which also can occur on a twice weekly basis, yield $25-$100 per vial.2
While eggs had an average market payment of only $1,500 fifteen years
ago,'2 women are now routinely paid $4,0048,000 per cycle, 29 although
medical guidelines limit such sales to three to six lifetime cycles . 30 Hair
commands between $125 and $2,600 but can be sold only infrequently.'

All of these materials are now available for sale in most

states. 32

25. See GOODWIN, supra note 12, at 152 ("Commercial plasma companies extract and
sell over 13 million units of plasma in the United States.").
26. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEHS-98-205, BLOOD PLASMA SAFETY:
PLASMA PRODUCT RISKS ARE Low IF GOOD MANUFACTURING PRACTICES ARE FOLLOWED 7
(1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/he98205.pdf (explaining plasma
donation practices in the United States); see also Frequently Asked Questions, BIOLIFE
PLASMA SERVICES, http://www.biolifeplasma.com/htm1/faq/faq.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2010) ("The body replaces the plasma removed during the donation process quickly;
therefore, healthy individuals can donate as often as twice in a seven-day period, with at
least one day between donations.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. See Brenda Reddix-Smalls, Assessing the Marketfor Human Reproductive Tissue
Alienability: Why Can We Sell Our Eggs But Not Our Livers?, 10 VAND. J.ENT. & TECH. L.
643, 653 (2008) (discussing the practices and prices for sperm sales); see also Sperm Donor
(last
FAQs, 123DONATE.COM, http://www.123donate.comf/spermdonorfaqs.html#week
visited Sept. 21, 2010) ("A minimum of 72 hours of sexual abstinence is generally needed
for specimens to pass our standards for processing. The number of donations per week is
based on donor specimen quality and overall lifestyle choices.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See Gina Kolata, Price of Donor Eggs Soars, Setting Off a Debate on Ethics, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1998/02/25/Us/price-ofdonor-eggs-soars-setting-off-a-debate-on-ethics.htmlI (noting that in 1993, the compensation
paid for human eggs was only $1,500).
29. See Mary Jo Layton, Fertile Market (Time to Sell Your Sperm and Eggs for Cash),
RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.), Feb. 8, 2009, at AOlI (noting that North Hudson IVF of New
Jersey pays women $4,000 for their eggs, while other New Jersey clinics pay women up to
$8,000).
30. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing the Line--or the Curtain?for Reproductive Technology, 32 HARv. J.L & GENDER 59, 102 (2009) ("Indeed, many
fertility clinics do limit donation cycles per donor to six and some to as few as three.").
31. See, e.g., THEHAIRTRADER, http://thehairtrader.com (last visited June 18, 2010)
(serving as an example of an internet marketplace that facilitates hair sales and trades
between the more than 12,000 users of the site) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
32. See Reddix-Smalls, supra note 27, at 652 (discussing the sale of eggs and sperm in
most states); see also Infertility IVF Clinics, IHR.COM, http://www.ihr.comfinfertility/
provider (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (listing hyperlinks to clinics in over forty states that
provide products and services for IVF procedures) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
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Markets for human body materials are continuing to expand
dramatically due to modem technological advances in the removal, storage,
transformation, and re-use of human body materials. 3 The secondary
market for transplantable human organs and soft tissue has become a multibillion dollar a year business, 34 facilitated by shifting legal standards that
increasingly provide decedents (or their next of kin) the right to transfer
body materials for transplantation or research upon death.3
Amounts offered to purchase body materials from individuals with
unique characteristics have skyrocketed in recent years. For plasma
containing rare antibodies, compensation can reach $1,000 per bleed.3
Sperm sells for $500 per vial in instances where the provider allows the
intended parent(s) to know his identity.3 Depending on a woman's exact
attributes, she can earn as much as $25,0004$50,000 for the sale of eggs
Markets for these reproductive materials have
from a single cycle.3
33. See generally Lori Andrews & Dorothy Nelkin, Whose Body Is It Anyway?
Disputes over Body Tissue in a Biotechnology Age, 351 LANCET 53 (1998) (discussing the
debates surrounding the use of human body tissue in light of scientific advances).
34. GOODWIN, Supra note 12, at 178; see also ASSOCIATED PRESS, Demand for Body
Parts Fuels Booming Trade, http:Ilwww. msnbc.msn.comlidllI 31 65909/printllI/display
mode/i 098 (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) ("Over the past two decades, the tissue industry has
exploded into a billion-dollar business, creating a huge demand for ligaments, tendons,
bones and other valuable body parts.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
The "secondary market" refers to the resale of body materials by an organization for use in
medical procedures, as opposed to "primary market" sales from an. individual of his or her
own body materials to the reselling organization.
35. See REVISED UNiF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 4, 9, 8A U.L.A. 63 (Supp. 2010)
[hereinafter RUAGA] (discussing which persons are authorized to make anatomical gifts of
a decedent's body or part for purpose of transplantation, therapy, research, or education).
While subsequent variations in law have occurred, initially every jurisdiction adopted the
UAGA. See Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, ANATOMICALGIFTACT.ORG, http://www.ana
tomicalgiftact.orgfDesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=1&tabid=67 (last visited Sept. 21, 2010)
("The original Uniform Anatomical Gift Act was promulgated in 1968, shortly after Dr.
Christian Barnard's successful transplant of a heart in November, 1967. It was promptly and
uniformly enacted in every jurisdiction.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
36. See, e.g., Donor Compensation, BLOOD & PLASMA RESEARCH, INC., http://
(last visited Sept. 21, 2010) ("Donor
www.bloodandplasma.com/compensate.htm
compensation ranges from $20 to $1,000 per donation.") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
37. See "Become Exclusive Donor" in NJ or NY, BioGENETics CORP., http://www.
sperm 1I.com/biogenetics/donor.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (listing the compensation
for anonymous and open identification sperm sales) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
38. Adrienne Knox, Have Brokers Gone Overboardfor Human Ova?, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, N.J.), Mar. 8, 1998, at 1 ("For three months an anonymous couple, through a
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experienced especially rapid growth, driven in part by technological
39
advances that now allow live births from frozen eggs.
In addition, the likelihood that NOTA will be revised to allow
payments for transplantable organs is on the rise. Since 2001, several bills
have been proposed in Congress that would allow for modest payments for
organs, although none has yet become law. 40 Even more importantly, in
2008 the American Medical Association adopted a directive specifically
advocating the modification of NOTA to rescind its prohibition of
payments for organs for transplantation so that researchers could conduct
pilot studies concerning the effectiveness of financial incentives for
medically valuable transfers.4
Moreover, to say that currently no legal U.S. market for transplantable
organs exists is not to say that there is no current U.S. market for such
organs. While black markets in other countries are well-documented,
broker, has been advertising in the Princeton University student newspaper for a young
woman willing to sell her ova, offering $35,000 plus expenses for the egg of an 'attractive,
intelligent woman with proven fertility.'').
39. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 30, at 78-79 ("Until recently, most donor eggs had to
be 'fresh.' As of 2007, there were only an estimated two hundred children worldwide born
Frozen eggs, however, provide opportunities for expanding the
from frozen eggs ....
market in eggs, perhaps resulting in an increased number of banks.").
40. For example, the Living Donor Tax Credit Act of 2007, H.R. 1035, 110th Cong.
(2007), would amend the Code to provide a nonrefundable personal credit of up to $5,000 in
any one tax year to individuals who donate all or any part of a kidney, liver, lung, pancreas,
intestine, or bone marrow. The credit would cover any unreimbursed costs and lost wages
incurred by an organ donor in connection with an organ transplant. Most recently the bill
was referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means on January 6, 2009. Living
Organ Donor Tax Credit Act of 2009, H.R. 218, 111 th Cong. (2009); see also H.R. 2090,
107th Cong. (2001) (providing a tax credit of up to $2,500); H.R. 1872, 107th Cong. (2001)
(proposing up to $ 10,000 in tax credits for deceased-donor organ donations).
On a more modest level, Georgia provides a seven dollar discount on driver's license
fees to residents agreeing to be organ donors. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-25(d)(2) (2003) (amended
2005). Pennsylvania approved a law providing $300 toward the funeral expenses of organ
donors, but the law was never enacted due to its conflict with NOTA. 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 8622 (West 2000). Other states provide nonrefuindable state income tax credits for
unreimbursed live organ donation expenses, including lost wages. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE
ANN.

§ 63-3029K (2008) (providing such a credit up to $5,000);

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-

10 15 (2009) (providing a credit up to $10,000).

41. See Amv. MED. Ass'N, DIRECTIVES OF THE AMA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 153 (2008),
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ad-com/polfind/Directives.pdf ("Our AMA will place
high on its legislative agenda modification of the National Organ Transplantation Act to
rescind prohibition of 'valuable consideration' for cadaveric organ donation, so that pilot
studies of financial incentives for donation can be carried out.").
42. See Interlandi, supra note 24, at 41 (noting the World Health Organization
estimated that approximately one-fifth of the 70,000 kidneys transplanted globally annually
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reports about the illegal trade in organs in the United States are harder to
verify. However, several authors allege its existence,4 and recently
evidence of sales of organs (specifically of kidneys) has surfaced in news
reports. In the late 1990s, for example, anthropologist Nancy ScheperHughes found evidence of illegal organ sales not only in Brazil, South
Africa, and China, but also in the United States."4 While the State
Department has classified reports of organ trafficking within the U.S. as
"urban legend,"'4 5 Nick Rosen filmed his sale of a kidney for transplantation
for $20,000 at Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York.4 Rosen further
reported that only one U.S. hospital he approached about performing the
transplantation blocked his efforts to move forward due to its screening
process .47 Levy-Izhak Rosenbaum was recently charged with brokering

come from black markets, and describing the trade of half-livers, eyes, skin and blood sold
illegally throughout the world); see also Steve P. Calandrillo, Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing
Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON L. REv. 69, 86-91 (2004)
(discussing what the author terms "the thriving global black market"); Robert Steinbuch,
Kidneys, Cash, andKashrut: A Legal, Economic, and Religious Analysis of Selling Kidneys,
45 Hous. L. REv. 1529, 1529-1607 (2009) (highlighting the international trade of body
parts).

43. See Nancy Scheper-Hughes, The Global Traffic in Human Organs, 41 CURRENT
ANT HROP. 191, 193 (2000) ("For many years Japanese nationals have resorted to various
intermediaries, sometimes with criminal connections, to locate donor hearts in other
countries, including China and the United States."); see also Michael Finkel, Complications,
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001, at F26, available at http://ww-w.nytimes.com/2001/05/27/
magazine/complications.htmil ("Some [U.S.] facilities, especially those struggling
financially, appear to employ a type of 'don't ask, don't tell' policy when it comes to
transplant surgeries on foreigners."); see also Charles C. Dunham, IV, "Body Property":
Challengingthe EthicalBarriers in Organ Transplantation to ProtectIndividual Liberty, 17
AN.NALS HEALTH L. 39, 58 (2008) (positing the existence of black markets, but without
providing evidence).
44. Interlandi, supra note 24, at 41; see also Marina Jimenez, Europe 's Poorest Sell
Their Kidneys, NAT'L POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at Al (reporting that, in 200 1, dozens of
Moldavians sought to enter the United States illegally to sell their kidneys).
45. Interlandi, supra note 24, at 41; see also David Porter & Carla K. Johnson, First
Case of Organ Trafficking in U.S.?, MSNBC, July 24, 2009, http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/3213237 I/ns/us -news-crime and courts/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (quoting
University of Pennsylvania ethicist Arthur_ Caplan as stating, with respect to organ
trafficking, that "[tlhere's certainly cross-national activity, but it hasn't touched the United
States or we haven't known about it until now") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
46. See Griffin & Fitzpatrick, supra note 3 (describing Rosen's kidney transfer and
compensation). Earlier reports put the compensation at $15,000. hIterlandi, supra note 24,
at 41.
47. See Interlandi, supra note 24, at 41 (noting that Rosen stated that one hospital in
Maryland screened him out of completing the kidney transfer).
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sales of kidneys between Israeli sellers and American recipients for
48
$10,000, with the transplants performed in U.S. hospitals.
As long as transfers of body materials were infrequent and payments
were insignificant, their appropriate tax treatment was of little consequence.
However, with the recent expansion of markets for human body materials
and the anticipated growth of such markets in the near future, a clear,
consistent, and coherent understanding of the tax consequences of these
transfers is needed. Without such a framework, taxpayers cannot know
their reporting obligations, and thus cannot comply with them or make
rational decisions about whether to participate in these markets. Moreover,
the Service and the courts cannot properly review and enforce existing tax
laws without an understanding of how they apply to human body materials.
For these reasons, it has become imperative to determine the proper tax
treatment of transfers of human body materials.
III, Existing Law Is Inadequate
Existing tax law concerning transfers of human body materials fails to
provide meaningful guidance to taxpayers, the I.R.S., or the courts.
Comprised of an amalgamation of often-contradictory I.R.S. rulings and
court cases, all from at least two decades ago, tax jurisprudence in this area
provides little aid. While the authorities consistently suggest that proceeds
from the sale of human body materials are taxable income, there is no clear
guidance about whether such proceeds are taxable as ordinary income or
capital gains, and the potential payroll, gift, and estate tax consequences of
48. See David M. Halbfinger, 44 Charged by US. in New Jersey Corruption Sweep,
N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009, Al, available at http://www.n ytimes.com/I2009/07/24/nyregion/
24jersey.html?pagewanted=2& -r-2&hp ("Another man in Brooklyn, Levy-Izhak
Rosenbaum, was accused of entiicing vulnerable people to give up a kidney for $10,000 and
then selling the organ for $160,000 .... Mr. Rosenbaum said that he had been in the
business of buying organs for years, according to the complaint."); see also Porter &
Johnson, supra note 45 (describing the organ donation selling scheme which led to
Rosenbaum's arrest). Janeen Interlandi reports that the market price of a kidney in the
United States is $30,000 and part of a liver sells for $10,000. See Janeen Interlandi, Body
Parts a la Carte: What Living Organ Donors Can Spare, HumAN CONDITON (July 24,
2009, 2:20 PM), http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/thehumancondition/archive/2009/07/24/
parts-ala-cart-what-living-organ-donors-can-spare.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) (listing
international and domestic prices for organs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Such deals may occur because NOTA permits gratuitous transfers; the individuals
who buy and sell organs may claim a family relationship where none exists to appear
legitimate. See, e.g., Interlandi, supra note 24, at 41 (reporting Rosen sold his kidney under
guise of being the recipient's cousin).
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transfers have not been addressed in any serious way. As a result, the tax
treatment of similar items and activities proves contradictory-a result
which the Service has, surprisingly, encouraged and Congress has ignored.
The resolution of these questions depends on the characterization of the
transaction as a transfer of property or as the performance of a service.
The taxation of human body materials is not covered in explicit terms
by the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"). Instead, taxpayers must
interpret the Code's general provisions that define terms such as "income,"
"ordinary income," and "capital gains." Even agents at the I.R.S.'s helpline
struggle with the proper reporting of proceeds from a sale of human eggs.
In response to several calls in association with the preparation of this
Article, agents provided clearly incorrec 4 9 or unhelpful advice. 50 Because
these transactions are often of limited value or are one-time events for any
given taxpayer, it is seldom efficient for a taxpayer to seek professional tax
advice on the matter. And, even if he or she did, there would not be any
reason to have a high degree of confidence in the advice provided given the
underlying lack of formal guidance. 5' Further complicating matters is the
49. One agent first transferred my call on this point to the department that handles
proceeds from livestock. Once I clarified that it was proceeds from the sale of human eggs,
she suggested that a charitable donation deduction for the amounts received might be most
appropriate. After I reiterated that it was the reporting of payments received by a taxpayer
for human eggs in which I was interested, she informed me that the classification by the
clinic of the payment as gains from the sale of property, independent contractor income, or
miscellaneous income determined the taxes that needed to be paid by a taxpayer. Telephone
Interview with I.R.S. Representative, I.R.S. Helpline (Mar. 11, 2009). However, this is not a
correct statement of tax law; it is the actual transaction that determines the tax treatment, not
the tax classification assigned by an employer or a taxpayer. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935) (stating that the proper characterization of a transfer for federal
income tax purposes depends upon the substance of the transaction); Joseph Radtke, S.C. v.
United States, 895 F.2d 1196, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that an employer may not
evade FICA and FUTA by characterizing all of the employee's remuneration as something
other than wages); cf Duberstein v. Comm'r, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (determining
whether a transfer from an employer to an employee is a gift or income, the transferor's
intention is the most critical consideration; however, the transferor's own characterization of
the payment is not determinative).
50. My research assistant was advised by one agent that such advice is "beyond the
scope" of permissible assistance and that we should consult a tax professional. Telephone
Interview with I.R.S. Representative, I.R.S. Helpline (May 20, 2009). Another agent offered
to research the matter and respond within fifteen days, but never, in fact, responded despite
repeated inquiry. After four such conversations spread over two months, we are still
awaiting an answer. Telephone Interview with I.R.S. Representative, I.R.S. Helpline (May
20, 2009); Telephone Interview with I.R.S. Representative, I.R.S. Helpline (June 15, 2009);
Telephone Interview with I.R.S. Representative, I.R.S. Helpline (June 24, 2009); Telephone
Interview with I.R.S. Representative, I.R.S. Helpline (July 8, 2009).
5 1. As of December 9, 2008, a search of RIA Checkpoint, an online tax database that
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limited likelihood of judicial clarification. In most cases, the tax benefits
that might be obtained by a taxpayer in a judicial forum are not sufficient to
justify litigation costs. Thus, this doctrinal uncertainty is unlikely to be
corrected absent formal action by Congress or the Service.
A. The Existing Statutory FrameworkDoes Not Directly Address the Issue
There are four separate federal tax regimes implicated by the transfer
of human body materials. Where the transfer involves payment-as when
sperm or eggs are sold to a clinic or plasma to a blood bank-both income
taxes and payroll taxes are potentially due. Where the transfer is both inter
vivos and gratuitous-as with eggs given to an infertile sister or a kidney to
a dying friend-gift tax liability may arise. And harvesting body materials
on death, or even burying a decedent's body intact, has potential estate tax
implications.
1. Income Tax Provisions
The threshold question for any income tax assessment is whether there
is "income"~ to be taxed in the first instance. The Code provides that,
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided. . . gross income means all income from
whatever source derived. 0 2 Among other items, amounts received as
compensation for personal services, business profits, and gains from
dealings in property"3 are specifically included as income.514 However, the
provides comprehensive coverage of U.S. tax matters and includes all I.R.S. rulings and
releases, proposed and enacted federal tax legislation (including Committee reports) and
court cases on tax matters, provides no relevant hits with respect to the taxation of proceeds
from human egg donations or sales.
52. I.R.C. §6 1(a) (2006).
53. "Property" is undefined in the Code. See id. § 7701 (providing a list of defined
terms, in which the term "property" does not appear). Instead, tax law looks to the rights
provided under state law to see whether they are sufficient to constitute property for federal
tax purposes. See, e.g., United States v. Irvine, 511 U.S. 224, 238 (1994) (restating "the
general and longstanding rule in federal tax cases that although state law creates legal
interests and rights in property, federal law determines whether and to what extent those
interests will be taxed"); see also Morgan v. Conin'r, 309 U.S. 78, 80 (1940) ("State law
creates legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights,
so created, shall be taxed.").
54. See I.R.C. § 6 1(a) (defining gross income). Items specifically excluded include
gifts and most damages received for personal physical injury or sickness. See id. § 102(a)
("Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or
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term "income" is to be interpreted broadly5 5 and includes all "undeniable
ascensions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have
This includes income received from illegal
complete dominion."5 6
5
7
activities and amounts received by nonresident aliens for performing
services or from the sale of inventory while in the United States.5
The source of a taxpayer's income determines the rate at which it is
taxed, the deductions available, and whether payroll taxes are due. Income
from the performance of services or from the operation of a business is
taxed at rates between 10% and 35% ("ordinary income tax rates"). 5 9 To
determine the appropriate tax treatment for gains from the disposition of
property, the property must be classified either as a capital asset or as
ordinary income property, and the taxpayer's holding period-generally the
amount of time the taxpayer owns the property prior to sale-must be
determined.
All property is a capital asset unless fitting one of eight specific
exceptions.6 Where a capital asset is held by the taxpayer for more than
inheritance."); see also id. § 104(a)(2) (providing that gross income does not include "the
amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received (whether by suit or
agreement and whether as lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal
physical injuries or physical sickness").
55. See Comm'r v. Jacobson. 336 U.S. 28, 48-49 (1949) (determining that in the
Federal Income Tax Acts, "[tihe income taxed is described in sweeping terms and should be
broadly construed in accordance with an obvious purpose to tax income comprehensively");
see also Comm'r v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945) ("Section 22(a) of the Revenue Act is
broad enough to include in taxable income any economic or financial benefit conferred on
the employee as compensation, whatever the form or mode by which it is effected.").
56. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
57. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6 1-14(a) (as amended in 1993) ("Illegal gains constitute gross
income.").
58. See I.R.C. §§ 861-62, 865 (2006) (providing for the taxation of sales and services
performed by nonresidents in the United States). Other gains from personal property are not
subject to U.S. tax. Id.
59. See Rev. Proc. 2008-66, 2008-45 I.R.B. 1107 (listing the tax rate tables for years
beginning in 2009). An employee-taxpayer who itemizes deductions and is not subject to
the alternative minimum tax may deduct business expenses, which, together with his or her
other "miscellaneous expenses," are greater than 2% of his or her adjusted gross income.
I.R.C. §§ 56(b)(l)(A)(i), 67(a). A self-employed taxpayer may deduct the ordinary and
necessary business expenses of the business without meeting the 2% floor. Id § 162.
60. See l.R.C. § 1221 (listing the exceptions to classification of property as a capital
asset). These exceptions are: (1) stock in trade or inventory, or property held primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or business; (2) property used
in a taxpayer's trade or business which may be depreciated, or real property used in a trade
or business; (3) certain copyrights, compositions, letters, memoranda, or similar property;
(4) certain accounts or notes receivable; (5) certain U.S. government publications; (6) certain
commodities derivative financial instruments; (7) certain hedging transactions; or
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one year prior to sale, the gain is taxed at preferential capital gains tax rates;
otherwise, it is taxed at ordinary income tax rates.6 Proceeds from the sale
of property are reduced by the taxpayer's capital investment (or "basis") in
the property before the tax due is calculated.6 Most assets have a basis
equal to their purchase price.6 A taxpayer must prove his or her basis in an
asset; absent substantiation, the full proceeds from sale of the asset are
taxable.64
A taxpayer who itemizes deductions may deduct the value of
charitable contributions he or she makes prior to calculating his or her tax
due . 65 However, the charitable contribution deduction is limited to
contributions of property, so that no deduction is allowed for the
(8) supplies regularly used or consumed by the taxpayer in the ordinary course of his or her
trade or business. Id.
61. Gains from capital assets held for more than one year ("long-term" capital assets)
are taxed at rates between 0% and 15% ("capital gain tax rates"). Those held for a year or
less ("short-term" capital assets) are taxed at ordinary income tax rates. See id. § 1222
(defining "long-term" and "short-term" capital assets); see also Jobs & Growth Tax Relief &
Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, § 301, 117 Stat. 752, 758 (reducing the
capital gains tax rates for individuals).

62. See I.R.S. Pun. 551:

BASIS OF ASSETS

1

(2002), available at http://www.

irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55l1.pdf (explaining "basis" as the amount of an individual's investment
in property for tax purposes).
63. See I.R.C. § 1012 ("The basis of property shall be the cost of such property, except
as otherwise provided in this subchapter and subchapters C (relating to corporate
distributions and adjustments), K (relating to partners and partnerships), and P (relating to
capital gains and losses)."). Amounts spent on improving capital assets increase this basis
rather than being immediately deductible and certain deductions taken prior to sale decrease
it. See id. § 10 11 (a) (explaining adjusted basis for determining gain or loss); id § 1016(a)
(stating that adjustments to basis will be made "for expenditures, receipts, losses, or other
items, properly chargeable to capital account"). In general, expenditures that add to the
value or useful life of an asset are either deducted over time, in the form of depreciation,
amortization, or depletion allowances, or increase the asset's basis. See id § 263 (listing the
capital expenditures for which deductions are not permitted); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(f)
("Amounts assessed and paid under an agreement between bondholders or shareholders of a
corporation to be used in a reorganization of the corporation or voluntary contributions by
shareholders to the capital of the corporation for any corporate purpose. Such amounts are
capital investments and are not deductible."). Where the useful life of the asset is indefinite,
a basis adjustment is made and reduces the gain when the asset is finally disposed of. See,
e.g., INDOPCO, Inc. v. Comm'r, 503 U.S. 79, 83-84 (1992) ("[A] capital expenditure
usually is amortized and depreciated over the life of the relevant asset, or, where no specific
asset or useful life can be ascertained, is deducted upon dissolution of the enterprise.").
64. See Gates v. Comm'r, 716 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11 th Cir. 1983) (stating that taxpayers
have the burden of proof with respect to basis); see also Better Beverages, Inc. v. United
States, 619 F.2d 424, 428 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
65. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006) (permitting tax deductions for charitable contributions and
gifts by individuals and corporations).
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contribution of services . 6 ' If the property is a long-term capital asset, the
taxpayer may deduct its fair market value; otherwise, the deduction is
67
limited to the lesser of fair market value and the item's basis.

2. Payroll Tax Provisions
In addition to being subject to income tax, gross income from the
performance of services or from operating a business is subject to payroll
taxes of 15.3%.68 Where the taxpayer is an employee, one-half of this tax
will be withheld from each paycheck and his or her employer will pay the

other

half.69

Where the taxpayer is self-employed, he or she is instead

responsible for paying the full amount ("self-employment tax,,). 70 Thus, the
actual federal tax rate range for services income is significantly higher than
that for other forms of income once these taxes are taken into account.

66. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(g) (as amended in 2008) ("No deduction is allowable
under section 170 for a contribution of services.").
67. I.R.C. § 170(e)(1) (allowing deductions from income for donations of ordinary
income and capital gain property to qualified charitable organizations); see also I.R.S., PUn.

526:

CHARITABLE

CONTRIBUTIONS

11

(2008), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-

pdf/p526.pdf (explaining the amount of deduction allowed for contributions of ordinary
income property and capital gain property). This difference can be substantial. For
example, consider three donations to a charitable organization. In the first, an attomney
donates five hours of her own legal work to the charity. She is not eligible to take a
charitable deduction since the contribution is of a service. If instead she donates securities
she bought several years ago for $10 which are now worth $100, she can deduct the full
$100 from her taxable income. However, if she chooses instead to donate vegetables she
grew in her garden with an initial investment of $10 that she would otherwise have sold at
the local farmer's market for $100, she may only deduct her initial $10 investment. Thus,
classification of a donation as one of long-term capital gain property results in highly
favorable tax treatment for a taxpayer.
68. These are comprised of 12.4% in social security taxes and 2.9% in Medicare taxes.
I.R.C. § 3101. For 2009, the social security portion of the tax is only due on the first
$106,800 of income. SOCIAL SECURITY ADmiN., Social Security and Supplemental Security
Income Program Rates and Limits, 2009, SOCIALSECURITY.Gov (Oct. 2008), http:/fwww.
ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/Prog_.highlights/RatesLimits2009.htint (last visited Sept. 22,
2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Medicare taxes are due on all
compensation. Id. In each case, 50% of the self-employment taxes are allowed as a
deduction for income tax purposes. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., Electronic Fact Sheet,
SOCIALSECURITY.GOV (Jan. 2010), http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10022.html (last visited Sept.
22, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
69. See I.R.C. § 3102 (requiring that payroll taxes be collected by employers).
70. See id. § 1401 (setting the rate of tax on self-employment income). These amounts
must be paid on self-employment income in excess of $600 in a single calendar year. Id.
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3. Gift Tax Provisions

Gift tax is imposed on gratuitous transfers of property made by a
taxpayer during his or her lifetime, unless the transfer is explicitly excluded
from taxation . 7 ' The most common exclusions are "annual exclusion"
gifts 72

and the payment of certain educational and medical expenses . 73 In

addition, there are deductions available for, inter alia, gifts to qualified
charitable organizations7 4 and transfers between spouses. 75 Currently, the
first $1 million in lifetime gifts is exempt from tax.7 Gifts in excess of that
amount are taxed on a progressive rate schedule that starts at 41% and
quickly reaches a maximum rate of 45% (on lifetime gifts in excess of
$2 million) . 77 The gift tax only applies to gratuitous and below-market
78
transfers of property; services may be provided without incurring this tax.
Most taxpayers escape gift taxation due to annual and lifetime exclusions,
but in cases where a taxpayer has made substantial gifts, as with the

71. See id. § 2501l(a)(1) ("A tax .. , is hereby imposed for each calendar year on the
transfer of property by gift during such calendar year by any individual, resident or
nonresident.").
72. In 2010, gifts by a taxpayer equal to or less than $13,000 per recipient are
excluded from taxation. See id § 2503(b) (excluding certain gifts from the gift tax); Rev.
Proc. 2009-2 1, 2009-16 I.R.B. 860 (providing an inflation adjustment to the value of gifts
that may be excluded from taxation under I.R.C. § 2503(b) in 2010).
73. See I.R.C. § 2503(e) (2006) (excluding certain transfers for educational or medical
expenses from gift taxation).
74. See id § 2522 (allowing deductions for gifts to governmental entities, certain
domestic corporations and unincorporated entities, certain domestic fraternal orders and
lodges, and domestic veterans organizations). There is no percentage limitation on the
amount of the charitable deduction for gift tax purposes. Id
75. See id § 2523(a) ("Where a donor transfers during the calendar year by gift an
interest in property to a donee who at the time of the gift is the donor's spouse, there shall be
allowed as a deduction in computing taxable gifts for the calendar year an amount with
respect to such interest equal to its value.").
76. See id. § 2505(a) (allowing a credit against the gift tax for total lifetime gifts not in
excess of $1 million).
77. See id. § 2502 (establishing the tax rate schedule for taxable gifts).
78. See id § 2501(a)(1) (specifying that the gift tax applies only to the transfer of
property by gift); see also Jack F. Thorne, Changes in Tax Rates Call for Review of

Effectiveness of Estate Planning Techniques,

ESTATE PLANNING,

July-Aug. 1988, at 220

("The gift tax is imposed only on transfers of property; gratuitous transfers of services are
not subject to tax.").
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purchase 79of a house for a child, the tax impact on future gifts can be
sizeable.7
4. Estate Tax Provisions
The estate tax is a tax on property transferred by the decedent at the
time of his or her death .80 As with the gift tax, only transfers of property
are subject to the tax,8' and there are deductions available for, inter alia,
property transferred to a qualified charitable organization 82 or to a surviving
spouse.8 Under 2009 law, estates with a net value of $3.5 million or less
were exempt from estate tax, with the value of property in excess of that
amount taxed at a 45% rate.84 Because the estate tax due is based on the
value of the property the decedent transfers at the time of his or her death,
even property that is disposed of thereafter is included in the calculation.
Thus, the clothes or jewelry in which a decedent is buried is included in the
value of his or her estate, even though no beneficiary will receive them,
unless their value is eligible to be deducted as a fuineral expense.8

79. See I.R.C. § 2505(a) (2006) (exempting a lifetime total of $1 million in gifts, then
imposing a tax of 4l1%/-45% on gifts above that).
80. See id. § 20011(a) ("A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of the taxable estate of
every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States."); id. § 203 1(a) ("The value
of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including to the extent provided
for in this part, the value at the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated."). In addition, certain lifetime transfers are included, but they
are not relevant here.
81. See id. §§ 2001, 2031 (imposing an estate tax "on the transfer of the taxable
estate," which includes "the value at the time of [a death of all property, real or personal,
tangible or intangible, wherever situated" (emphasis added)).
8~2. See id. § 2055 (allowing deductions for certain charitable contributions from the
value of the taxable estate).
83. See id § 2056 (allowing a deduction from the taxable estate for certain interests in
property which pass from the decedent to or for the benefit of his or her surviving spouse).
84. See id. § 2010 (providing the applicable credit amount for estate tax purposes).
This amount must be reduced by the value of taxable gifts made by the decedent to which
gift tax credit amounts were applied. Id § 2012. So, for example, if a decedent made
$750,000 in taxable gifts during his or her lifetime, $2.75 million of his estate would not be
taxed upon his or her death in 2009. In 2010 there is no estate tax. In 2011 and thereafter,
current law allows only a $1,000,000 estate tax exclusion, with rates rising quickly from
41% to 50%. Id. § 2010. However, many commentators expect this law to be amended to
provide an exclusion and rates at or near the 2009 levels.
85. See id § 2053(a)(1) (allowing a deduction from a decedent's gross estate for
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S. Conclusions

For at least five important reasons, the distinction between property
and nonproperty is critical to determining the appropriate tax treatment
under these regimes. First, most income is subject to taxation at ordinary
income tax rates, with only gains from property potentially eligible for the
highly favorable capital gains tax rates. Second, only compensation for
services and proceeds from operating a business are subject to payroll
taxes; proceeds from sales of property designated as capital assets are not.
Third, charitable contributions of property potentially provide an income
tax deduction, whereas contributions of services are nondeductible. Fourth,
only transfers of property are subject to the gift estate tax. Finally, only the
value of property is included in a decedent's estate for estate tax purposes.
This distinction is thus critical for determining the appropriate tax
treatment of transfers of human body materials. If human eggs are properly
classified as property, the proceeds from their sale are potentially eligible
for capital gains tax rates, their transfer to an infertile family member free
of charge is potentially subject to gift tax and their value is potentially
includible in a decedent's estate. If not, any such proceeds are subject to
tax at ordinary income tax rates and to payroll taxes. Despite the relevance
of this distinction to existing tax regimes, the Code does not address the
issue of the appropriate characterization of human body materials, and the
Service and the courts have done little to fill the legal gap.
B. Existing Guidance Is Contradictory,Narrowly Drawn, and Outdated
Existing guidance about the appropriate tax treatment of transfers of
human body materials raises more issues than it resolves. I.R.S. rulings are
contradictory: The only binding* statement of the Service's position is a
1953 revenue ruling that it later repudiated in nonbinding publications.
Moreover, judicial decisions are narrowly drawn to answer only the
immediate question at hand, thus providing little guidance. In short, U.S.
taxpayers have no meaningful official guidance to aid them in complying
with their filing requirements with respect to these transfers.
Service guidance is contradictory and outdated. The only binding
ruling issued by the Service with respect to the proper tax treatment of
transfers of human body materials is a pronouncement in Revenue Ruling

funeral expenses allowed by the laws of the applicable jurisdiction).

WHA TARE WE-LABORERS, FACTORIES, OR SPARE PARTS?

17
1073

162,8 which was issued in 1953. There, in response to a taxpayer request
for advice on whether a deduction would be allowed for federal income tax
purposes for the fair market value of a blood donation to a charitable
organization, the Service asserted that providing blood for a transfusion was
a personal service, not a donation of property.8 Therefore, no deduction
was available."8
In 1975, when a similar question arose with respect to the donation of
mother's milk to a charitable organization, the Service reversed its
It declared that a "donation of mother's milk is clearly a
position.8
donation of property." 90 In fact, even blood was "a commodity with a
commercial market and value apart from its donor" 91 so that deciding the
instant matter on the basis of Revenue Ruling 162 would be "contrary to an
92
ordinary understanding of the facts presented."
The Service declared the milk to be a capital asset as none of the
exceptions to capital asset treatment applied to it.93 Next, the Service
addressed the taxpayer's holding period for the milk. After raising the
question of whether the period appropriately began at the time of the milk's
creation or upon extraction, the Service concluded that the distinction did
not matter. In either case, the total time period was less than needed to
make the milk a long-term capital asset. 94 Similarly, it opined that the
distinction would not matter with respect to blood since:
[T~he greater part of whole blood (by volume) has a life of less than six
months in the body. Therefore, if sold upon withdrawal, the sale
arguably would not give rise to long-term capital gain whether the
86. See Rev. Rul. 162, supra note 14, at 127 (finding that furnishing blood for a
transfusion, or to a blood bank, is the provision of a personal service by the donor rather than
a contribution of property).
8 7. Id.
88. Id. at 128 (deciding that "the fair market value of blood donated by an individual
to a charitable institution is not deductible as a charitable contribution").
89. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36418, 1975 GCM LEXIS 112, at *1 (Sept. 15,
1975) (declaring that the fair market value of mother's milk donated to a charitable
organization is deductible as a charitable contribution under It. Rev. Code of 1954, § 170).
90. Id. at *3.
9 1. Id. at *6.
92. Id.
93. See id. at *7 n.2 ("Since the milk in question does not seem to fall within any
exception under Code § 1221, it is a capital asset.").
94. See id ("It is arguable that the holding period should start at the time of
withdrawal because at that time the milk is property separate and apart from the person
producing it.").
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holding period includes the lifetime of the blood in the body or begins at
the time95 of withdrawal when it is property separate and apart from the

person.

The Service's reversal of position with respect to the proper
characterization of human body materials, however, failed to resolve the
issue because it was contained in a general counsel memorandum. These
memoranda are not binding on the Service and may not be relied upon by
taxpayers in their tax filings. Moreover, the Service's Chief Counsel
96
recommended against the issuance of a binding ruling for two reasons.
First, because the milk could not be long-term capital gain property and the
taxpayer had not established that she had any basis in the milk, the tax
result would be the same whether the milk provided was classified as a
service or as property so there was no need to issue a ruling to answer the
Second, the Service acknowledged that it was not
immediate question.9
prepared to resolve the resulting issues with respect to the appropriate gift
and estate tax treatment if human body materials were characterized as
property. Specifically, the Service worried that:
If any part of the body is property then a gift tax should be levied on the
gift of a kidney for transplant if it is not given through a charitable
organization. Likewise, a taxpayer's estate includes the value of all
property in which he had an interest at death. The value of a decedent's
world
body should therefore be includible in his estate. In today's
98
where transplants take place daily, these issues are not illusory.
To avoid the difficulties suggested by this analysis, the Service declined to
publish a revenue ruling recognizing that human body materials could be
property. 99 As a result, no official statement of the Service's change in
position with respect to the proper characterization of charitable donations
of human body materials exists.
In litigation with taxpayers, the Service has oscillated between the two
approaches with no clear resolution. Further muddying the waters, the
Service asserted in a 1987 private letter ruling that proceeds from the sale
95. Id. at nn.2-3.
96. Id. at *7.
97. Id. ("The taxpayer had a zero basis in her milk unless she showed that she incurred
expenses directly attributable to its production. The gain would not have been long-ternm
capital gain because the milk was not a capital asset held for more than six months. .. .)
see also supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text (discussing the taxation of capital gains).
98. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36418, supra note 89, at *8.
99. Id. at *8-.9. At this time, transfers of human body materials are not reported for
gift tax purposes or included in the value of a decedent's estate for estate tax purposes.
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of blood are taxable income, without addressing whether the blood was
property or how to report the income.1 00
Judicial decisions are narrow and incomplete. Courts have not
cleared up the confusion created by the Service's incomplete and
contradictory guidance on the tax treatment of transfers of human body
materials. This is for two reasons. First, there are only a few judicial
decisions concerning the subject. Second, each of these decisions produced
only a narrowly crafted opinion, resolving only the specific issue before the
court. The courts agree with the Service that proceeds from the sale of
human body materials are taxable income, but they establish no clear rules
for how that income should be reported and taxed. And none of the cases
addresses gift and estate tax issues at all.
The question of whether proceeds from the sale of blood are taxable
income was first raised, and ultimately avoided, in a published court
opinion in 1979.101 There, the taxpayer, Dorothy Garber, sold her blood to
three companies on a regular basis, receiving in return a weekly salary, use
of a car, an end-of-year bonus, and a sliding scale amount based on the
strength of the plasma obtained from her blood. 102 Taxes were withheld
from the salary payments, but all other amounts were paid by check without
withholding.103 Garber failed to pay income taxes on these amounts and
was convicted of tax evasion.'04
On appeal, the taxpayer argued that no income tax could be due
because she had no income. Instead, she asserted that she had simply
exchanged her plasma for money of equal value, so there was no gain on
the transaction to be taxed.' 05 Garber also asserted that the proceeds should
not be taxable because they represented "the exchange of something so
10 6
personal that its value is not susceptible to measurement."

100. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8814010 (Dec. 30, 1987) (asserting that "amounts received for
the sale of blood are includible in the gross income of the blood 'donor"').
101. See United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1979) (addressing whether
the sale of blood would result in taxable income).
102. See id. at 94 (indicating that in exchange for her "blood plasma," Garber was paid
"on a sliding scale dependent on the titre or strength of the plasma obtained").
103. 1d.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 95 ("The defense proffered [testimony] to the court .. . that the money
received by Garber was not within the legal definition of income in [I.R.C. §] 6 1(a) and that
she had therefore participated in tax-free exchanges.").
106. Id The taxpayer cited Doyle v. Mitchell Brothers, 247 U.S. 179 (1918), in support
of her argument. Id.
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Instead of addressing either point, the Garber court focused on the
novelty of the question presented. One government witness had admitted
that the case was the first to address the question of the taxation of proceeds
received in exchange for body products107 and another "conceded that the
taxability of money received for giving up a part of one's body is a unique
and undecided question in tax law."108 Under the circumstances, the court
stated that it did not need to decide what the substantive tax rules should be
in this "uncharted area in tax law." 09 Instead, this uncertainty meant that
Garber could not be guilty of willfully and intentionally evading her tax
liability as required by the controlling criminal statute." 0 Thus, whether the
taxpayer had realized income was undecided by the court.
In more recent years, the human capital theory embodied in the
argument that exchanges of human body materials cannot produce income
has since been rejected by the courts."' Instead, any proceeds received are
included as income, and thus subject to tax, because they represent
ascensions to wealth received by the taxpayer that are not excluded under
the Code." 2 These later decisions, though, leave open key questions about
the proper characterization of this income and applicable holding periods.
Of particular importance, in Green v. Comm issioner'13 the Tax Court
4
addressed how to characterize income received from sales of plasma."
Green, like Garber, sold her plasma on a regular basis. She reported the
proceeds of these sales as income from a business and claimed offsetting
deductions. The Service denied substantially all of the claimed deductions,

107. Id. at 95.
108. Id. at 95-96.
109. Id at 99.
110. Id. atl100.
111. See Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538, 1540-41 (11Ith Cir. 1986) (determining
that taxpayers bear the burden of proving "basis in the blood" and that "the holding period
for blood is more than six months[;] furthermore, the failure to do so renders taxpayers to be
not entitled to a charitable deduction under [I.R.C. §] 170(e)(l)(A)"); see also Murphy v.
I.R.S., 493 F.3d 170, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 553 U.S. 1004 (2008) (holding that
taxpayer's compensatory damages award was not exempt under I.R.C. § 104(a)(2), and thus
"income" under I.R.C. § 611(a)).
112. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of
"income'').
113. Green v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1238 (1980) (holding that the loss of minerals
from the blood and the eventual loss of the ability of the blood to regenerate from
"donations" are not among those depletions of "natural deposits" for which deductions are
provided within the scope of I.R.C. § 611).
114. Id.
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asserting that the provision of plasma was a service," 5 and thus the
6
deductibility of the expenses was limited."
In holding that the taxpayer was entitled to deduct her ordinary and
necessary business expenses, the Green court found that the taxpayer's
sales of plasma were sales of a noncapital asset.' '7 While recognizing the
troubling equation of a human body to an animal's body, the court likened
Green's blood to "hen's eggs, bee's honey, cow's 8milk, or sheep's wool"
purchased and sold for processing and distribution."
Under the court's analysis, the human body was envisioned as
"1manufacturing machinery"-a factory-producing a product for sale on
the market 1 19 However, the court declined to extend this analysis to the tax
In
treatment of the intact human body as opposed to its plasma. 2
particular, the court rejected the taxpayer's claimed deduction for a
depletion allowance for her body's "natural deposits" and regenerative
ability. 12 ' Thus, the court distinguished between the intact human body as
exclusively a legal actor and its constituent materials that, once extracted,
may become marketable commodities. Notably, the Green court did not
discuss the payroll tax consequences of its decision. Instead, it merely
observed in a footnote that any adjustment to Green's taxable income
22
would require a corresponding adjustment to her self-employment taxes.
115. While unclear from the text of the Green opinion, the Service later clarified that its
stance in the Green case had been that a sale of plasma is a performance of a service based
on Revenue Ruling 162. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38730, 1981 GCM LEXIS 192, at *1
(May 22, 1981) (suggesting "acquiescence in the Tax Court opinion and that the rationale of
[Revenue Ruling] 162 be modified accordingly.").
116. Green, 74 T.C. at 1232. A few of the claimed amounts were denied for lack of
proper substantiation. Id.
117. Id. at 1233-34. In reaching this conclusion, the court stated without analysis that
the transactions that produced the income were not the sale of a capital asset. Thus, since
Green performed no substantial service in providing her plasma, her sales were of ordinary
income property. Id.
118. Id. at 1234.
119. Id. at 1236.
120. See id. at 1238 (determining that, while commuting expenses are usually
nondeductible personal expenses, in this case taxpayer "was the container in which her
[blood] was transported to market[,]" thus taxpayer's "trips to and from the lab were solely
for business purposes, not for her personal comfort or convenienceE,]" and were therefore
deductible).
12 1. Id.
122. See id. at 1229 n.1 ("The contested adjustment to petitioner's taxable income
necessarily resulted in adjustments to petitioners self-employment tax and claimed sales tax
deduction for 1976, as well as the treatment of medical insurance premiums as a medicalexpense deduction, rather than a business-expense deduction, by the respondent in the notice
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In a nonbinding statement, the Service recommended acquiescence to
the Green result.123 it explained that it agreed "that the court properly
characterized the petitioner's blood plasma as a product." 2 4 In keeping
with this statement, the Service explicitly repudiated Revenue Ruling
162. 125 Moreover, the Service recommended that a ruling project be
undertaken to modify Revenue Ruling 162 accordingly.126 However, no
replacement ruling has ever been issued, once again leaving taxpayers with
no binding precedent as to the Service's announced change of mind.
A few years later, courts again considered whether blood is property.
In Lary v. United States,'27 the taxpayer claimed a deduction for his
contribution of blood to a qualified charitable organization.' 28 The Service
denied the deduction, claiming the donation of blood was the provision of a
service. The trial court upheld the denial based on Revenue Ruling 162 129
despite the Service's earlier public, yet nonbinding, renunciations." 0
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit declined to decide whether the
taxpayer had transferred property or performed a service in donating his
blood. In its view, because blood cells have a lifespan of approximately
four months in the human body, they cannot be long-term capital gain
assets since they could not be held by the taxpayer for more than one year
of deficiency.").
123. Green v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980), action on dec., 1981-128, 1981 AOD
LEXIS 44, at *2 (Apr. 23, 1981). An action on decision is issued by the I.R.S. National
Office with respect to a litigated point and sets forth whether the Service will follow an
adverse decision or continue to contest the point. It is not intended as taxpayer guidance and
may not be cited as precedent for a taxpayer's position.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38730, supra note 115, at *2 ("[W]e recommend that
a ruling project be initiated to modify [Revenue Ruling] 162 to be consistent with the
acquiescence in Green.").
127. See Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11 th Cir. 1986) (determining that
no tax deduction was allowable for blood donations).
128. Id. Interestingly, the donation in question was one pint of blood. The cases do not
report the value claimed or the presumably larger principle at stake that made it worth
appealing to the Eleventh Circuit.
129. See Lary v. United States, 608 F. Supp. 258, 263 (N.D. Ala. 1985) ('Furnishing
blood for a transfusion or to a blood bank has been deemed analogous to the rendering of a
personal service by the donor rather than a contribution of property, and ... has long been
held not to be deductible as a charitable contribution." (citations omitted)).
130. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38730, supra note 115, at *2 (suggesting a
modification be made to Revenue Ruling 162); Green v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1229 (1980),
action on dec., 1981-128, 1981 AOD LEXIS 44, at *2 (Apr. 23, 1981) (recommending
acquiescence to Green).
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prior to sale.'"' Thus, even if they were property, any deduction would be
limited to the lesser of the fair market value of the blood and the taxpayer's
basis in it.'
Since the taxpayer had presented no evidence that he had any
basis in the blood, and no deduction would be allowed if the donation was
of a service, no amount was deductible regardless of the characterization of
the human body materials. 313 There have been no fuirther published court
decisions on the point.
These materials reveal two simple facts. First, the guidance on the tax
treatment of transfers of human body materials that has been provided by
the Service and the courts is contradictory and incomplete. Second, this
guidance does not take into account modem technology, the proliferation of
transfers of human body materials, and the variations within current
markets. As a result, taxpayers have little formal tax guidance to assist
them in deciding whether to engage in transactions involving human body
materials.
C. Advice Given by Clinics Is Erroneous
The difficulties faced by taxpayers are illustrated by the practical
problems confronting patients of assisted reproduction clinics. In this
setting, egg transferors are often told that they are being compensated for
their time and effort, not for the product they are providing. This advice is
given even though (1) a substantial portion (or all) of the payment is not
made until the egg is successfully transferred; (2) the amount of the
payment does not depend on the time spent on injections and appointments;
and/or (3) the donor receives a higher pay-out if the material is secured than
if it is not.'13 4 These assertions, which are often made to counter concerns
131. See Lary, 787 F.2d at 1540 (indicating that blood needed to be held for longer than
six months to qualify for "long-term capital gain treatment"). The period is now more than
one year. I.R.C. § 1222(3).
132. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing tax deductions for long-term
capital assets).
133. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the deductibility of donated
services).
134. See, e.g., Oregon Health and Science University, Become and [sic] Egg Donor,
OHSU.EDu, http://www.ohsu.edu/xd/health/services/women/services/fertility/fertility-services/
third-party-programslbecome-and-egg-donor.cfin (last visited Sept. 21, 20 10) ("Egg donors are
compensated $5,000 on the day of the egg collection. This is the financial way we can
acknowledge your time, effort, and generosity.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); see also Egg Donation Compensation, EGG DONATION AND SURROGACY CENTER,
http://www.findadonor.com/dDonorCompensation.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) ("Donors
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about baby selling,135 suggest that egg sales generate ordinary, rather
than capital gain, income. Self-interested statements by the clinics
buying the eggs, however, do not change the underlying nature of the
transaction for tax purposes.
Anecdotally, the Service has raised the possibility of selfemployment taxes being due on sales of eggs and sperm, 136 and some
clinics advise donors that they are independent contractors to insulate
37
themselves from liability for the employer half of these taxes."
However, this information is not necessarily accurate; to the extent the
sale represents simply the sale of a capital asset, no payroll taxes are
due. Thus, a taxpayer attempting to comply with her tax obligations
who relies on the advice provided by clinics might well end up
significantly overpaying.
D. Treatment by Commentators Is Narrow and/or Outdated
Commentators have not filled the gap left by Congress, the Service
and the courts. Little has been written about the appropriate tax
treatment of transfers of human body materials; in fact, the most often
cited authority is a 1973 student Note which predates all of the available

receive $1,000 when they begin medication [and] [tihe remaining compensation is given to
donors within 3 days of the completion of the egg donation retrieval.") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also BioGENETICS CORP., supra note 37 ("Although
these monies are taxable, donors will not receive a 1099 from Biogenetics Corporation
because we are reimbursing you for your time expended at the cryobank, traveling expenses,
and your efforts in complying with the program requirements.").
135. See Jay A. Soled, The Sale of Donors 'Eggs: A Case Study of Why Congress Must
Modify the CapitalAsset Definition, 32 U.C. DAvis L. Ruv. 919, 921 n.5 (1999) ("Physicians
at infertility clinics are fearflul that the public might associate the sale of eggs with the sale of
babies.").

136.

See, e.g., Posting of Sglein,

TAxALMANAC,

http://www.taxalmanac.org/index.

phpfDiscussion:Taxability_of_%22Donating%/22_anEggCell %28Ovum%29 (last visited
Sept. 20, 2010) (reporting that the I.R.S. assessed a deficiency for failure to pay selfemployment taxes on a payment for egg donation on a taxpayer who reported it as
miscellaneous income) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).

137.

See, e.g., California Cryobank Sperm Donor Compensation, CAL.

CRYOnANK,

(last visited Sept. 20, 2010)
http://www.sperinbank.com/newdonors/index.cfmn?ID=4
("[S]perm donor[s] ... will be classified as [independent contractors] under the [IRC].
Although no taxes are deducted from reimbursement checks, we are required to report the
reimbursement paid .... In 1995, the IRS instructed California Cryobank to issue 1099's to
all sperm donors earning $600 or more in any. .. year.") (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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guidance, except Revenue Ruling 162. 138 There, the author concluded
that most human body materials should be treated as capital assets and
that gains from their sale should be considered long-term.' 39 In a more
recent article, Jay Soled argued that eggs are capital assets that produce
long-term gain on sale.14 0 Both of these analysts, however, miss
important points and leave many questions unanswered, including
whether all human body materials are properly classified as capital
assets and, for those that are, how the holding period should be
calculated. Neither author discusses payroll taxes and neither develops
a framework for considering these materials in the context of estate and
gift taxes. Instead, the author of the 1973 Note proposes statutory
exclusions for gratuitous transfers of human body materials, suggesting
4
that in the absence of such provisions their transfer would be taxable.'1 '
Most recently, Bridget Crawford discussed the appropriate tax treatment
of income from surrogacy, but did not extend the analysis to other
42
transactions that involve human body materials.1
These works are the most comprehensive analyses of the issue;
other scholars identifying the issue of the proper tax treatment of human
body materials have simply opined that a legislative solution of some
sort is needed.143 They are correct. In the meantime, however, sound
rules must be built from the statutes and guidance that currently exist so
138. Note, supra note 18, at 842 (discussing the tax consequences of "anatomical
transfer[s]").
139. Id. at 856-57.
140. See Soled, supra note 135, at 923-29 (basing his conclusion on holdings in the
charitable contribution, tax accounting, and installment sales contexts).
141. Note, supra note 18, at 865-66.
142. See generally Bridget J. Crawford, Taxation, Pregnancy and Privacy, 16 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 327 (2010).
143. See Frederick R. Parker, Jr., Taxation and the Human Body: An Analysis of
Transactions Involving Kidneys, 94 J. TAx'N 367, 367 (2001) (noting that the "literal
application of existing tax law and jurisprudence could lead to results that are
counterintuitive and inconsistent with existing notions of both tax and health policy," but
failing to identify a solution); see also Frederick R. Parker, Jr. et al., Organ Procurement
and Tax Policy, 2 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 173, 173-75 (2002) (observing that current
tax law does not adequately accommodate transfers of human body materials and suggesting
a full income, gift, and estate exclusion for gratuitous organ transfers); Frederick R. Parker,
Jr. & William J. Winslade, Tax Policy and the Blood Supply, 42 ExEMPT ORG. TAx REv. 89,
90 (2003) ("Recognizing that many factors affect the appropriate alignment between tax
policy and the blood supply, we do not propose here to set any specific boundaries."); Note,
The Sale of Human Body Parts, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1182, 1256-64 (1973) (suggesting
generally that a legislative solution to the problem of the appropriate characterization of
human body materials as services or products is needed, but providing no specifics).
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that taxpayers know their tax obligations
transactions involving their body materials.

before

entering

into

IV The Problem Is Multifaceted and Complex
Resolving the appropriate tax treatment of transfers of human body
materials is not easy. There are multiple and distinct tax systems
involved. As a result, characterizations that seem appropriate for
income tax purposes may not make sense when viewed from a gift or
estate tax perspective. Larger philosophical debates about whether
human bodies or their constituent materials are ever properly regarded
as property contribute to legal uncertainty. Finally, the development of
markets for human body materials has pressed the issue with respect to
taxes in advance of well-developed-or any-governing frameworks.
A. The Debate Is Framedby Broader Dispute over How We View
Human Bodies and Their Materials
The uncertainty in tax law about the proper characterization of
human body materials is underpinned by a broader legal ambivalence
toward human bodies as both legal actors and as legal prpry'4
While federal tax law questions focus on the proper classification of
income produced from transfers of body products and whether there is
property for estate and gift tax purposes, most federal and state law in
this area focuses on more fundamental matters-whether, when, and
how human body materials are transferrable at all. The importance of
these questions has increased dramatically as the demand for body
materials for transplantation and research has grown.
Since the abolition of slavery in 1865, and the subsequent adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment, property rights have not existed in living
human bodies. 145 Instead, the interests we have in our bodies are
formulated as liberty interests, protected by substantive due prcss 4
144. There are other contexts in which this issue is arising, for example, products
liability. However, this Article is limited to the legal understanding and classifications of
human body materials under federal tax law.
145. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process protection of an individual's exclusive right
to possess and control his body, and to prevent unauthorized physical invasions).
146. See Dunham, supra note 43, at 51 ("Historically, the rights in a living body have
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The more difficult question is what rights exist in excised body parts and
corpses and how those rights are protected. Historically, these materials
were not property and, thus, personal ownership of them was not legally
protected.14 7 Public health laws required that a decedent's family
properly dispose of his or her body, but did not provide any personal
48
remedy if this obligation was interfered with.1
As the demand for cadavers for medical research and training grew
in the late nineteenth century, however, corpses gained economic value
and there was a corresponding increase in claims that bodies had been
wrongfully taken or mutilated.14 9 In response, some "courts began to
recognize an exclusive right of the next of kin to possess and control the
disposition of the bodies of their dead relatives, the violation of which
was actionable at law." 150
Many courts that addressed the issue
developed a "quasi-property" right, in which a decedent's next of kin
was held to have an exclusive right to possess and control the decedent's
body for the sole purpose of burial, and to prevent unauthorized
disturbances thereafter.'
Under this approach, the right to custody of the decedent's body, to
receive it free of mutilation, and to have it treated respectfully vest in
the decedent's next of kin.152 Instead of being an affirmative right to
been viewed as a liberty interest, and not as property."); see also Radhika Rao, Property,
Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. Rcv. 3 59, 365-400 (2000) (distinguishing when
human bodies are protected by liberty interests and when as property).
147. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *429 (noting that an heir has no
property in the "bodies or ashes [of decedents]; nor can he bring any suit or action against
such as indecently, at least, if not impiously, violate and disturb their remains, when dead
and buried").
148. See 22A Am. JUR. 2D Dead Bodies § 1 (2003) ("[T~he matter of the disposition of
the dead is so involved in the public interest, including the public's health, safety, and
welfare, that it is subject to control by law. . . .)
149. See Dorothy Nelkin & Lori Andrews, Do the Dead Have Interests? Policy Issues
for Research After Life, 24 Am. J. L. & MED. 261, 262-63 (1998) (tracing connection
between increasing value of corpses for medical scholarship and bodysnatching from the
Renaissance to the nineteenth century).
150. Sathyavaglswaran,287 F.3d at 792.
151. See, e.g., Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R.I. 227, 238 (R.I.
1872) (holding that a corpse could "be considered as a sort of quasi property"); see also
Pollard v. Phelps, 193 S.E. 102, 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937) ("[A] quasi property right belongs
to the husband or wife, and, if neither, to the next of kin.").
152. See Whitehair v. Highland Memory Gardens, 327 S.E.2d 438, 441 (W. Va. 1985)
("[Q]uasi-property rights of. .. survivors include the right to custody of the body; to receive
it in the condition in which it was left, without mutilation; to have the body treated with
decent respect, without outrage or indignity thereto; and to bury or otherwise dispose of the
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ownership and possession, quasi-property protection affords only a right
to dispose of the body of a close relative in narrowly prescribed ways
without interference from others. 513 Because this quasi-property right is
neither pecuniary in nature nor transferable, it falls well short of
conferring true property rights on the heirs.154 Whatever rights there are
emerge at the moment of death and are not predicated upon any interest
the decedent might have had in his or her own body during life.'"5
Moreover, any such right generally covers only an intact corpse, not
individual organs removed from that corpse.' 5 6 The disconnect between
human bodies and property rights is even more clearly shown by the fact
57
that this quasi-property approach has never been generally accepted' 1
body without interference." (citing Infield v. Cope, 270 P.2d 716, 719 (N.M. 1954))).
153. See, e.g., Dunham, supra note 43, at 50 (stating that a quasi-property right is a
"protected 'negative right' to be free from interference with possession of the decedent's
body, rather than a 'positive right' of ownership to demand possession of the body").
154. See, e.g., Ga. Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. 1985) (finding
that quasi-property rights in corpses are not constitutionally protected property rights).
155. See, e.g., Bauer v. N. Fulton Med. Ctr., 527 S.E.2d 240, 244 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999)
("The quasi-property right in a corpse is not pecuniary in nature, nor should it be .... [The
law] will not impose a pecuniary value on the flesh itself. To do so would make the strangest
thing on earth that much stranger."); see also Dougherty v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust
Co., 387 A.2d 244, 246 n.2 (Md. 1978) ("It is universally recognized that there is no
property in a dead body in a commercial or material sense."); Hasselbach v. Mount Sinai
Hosp., 159 N.Y.S. 376, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916) ("It is well settled. .. that there are no
property rights, in the ordinary commercial sense, in a dead body.. .. "); RESTATEMENT
(SECONDm) OF TORTS

§ 868 cmt. a (1979) (noting that the right to control a corpse does

"not .. , fit very well into the category of property, since the body ordinarily cannot be sold
or transferred, has no utility and can be used only for the one purpose of interment or
cremation"); W.L. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 58-59 (4th ed. 1971) (referring to a quasiproperty right as a "dubious 'property right' to a body .. , which did not exist while the
decedent was living, cannot be conveyed, [and] can be used only for the one purpose of
burial"). In some cases the right could be relinquished. See McCoy v. Ga. Baptist Hosp.,
306 S.E.2d 746 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (indicating that a release of their stillborn child to a
hospital ended the parents' quasi-property right in their child's body).
156. See, e.g., Fuller v. Marx, 724 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir. 1984) ("We know of no
Arkansas cases which extend this quasi-property right to all of the body's organs .. . ."); see
also Albrecht v. Treon, 889 N.E.2d 120, 129 (Ohio 2008) ("[Tlhe next of kin of a decedent
upon whom an autopsy has been performed do not have a protected right under Ohio law in
the decedent's tissues, organs, blood, or other body parts that have been removed and
retained by the coroner for forensic examination and testing."). But see Hainey v. Parrott,
No. 1 :02-CV-733, 2005 WL 2397704, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2005) (holding that there is
a cognizable property interest in a decedent's body parts, in the context of a suit over the
failure to return the brain of a decedent upon completion of an autopsy).
157. See, e.g., Carney v. Knollwood Cemetery Ass'n, 514 N.E.2d 430, 435 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1986) (criticizing quasi-property as legal fiction). The Carney court's rejection of the
quasi-property regime was recently affirmed in Albrecht, 889 N.E.2d at 124, 128-29, which
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and has more recently fallen out of favor even where it was previously
used. 158
Federal courts have at times been willing to extend constitutional
protection to the rights of a next of kin in a decedent's corpse on a
In three cases concerning the harvesting of
property-based theory.'
decedents' corneas without the consent of the next of kin, courts held
that the interests at stake were legitimate claims of entitlement that
deserved due process protection whether or not labeled "property" in the
forum jurisdiction.16 0 The courts focused on the substance of the rights
afforded under state law instead of the label formally assigned to the
16
claimant's interest. Commentators have endorsed this approach. 1
declined to find a quasi-property right in autopsy specimens. See also Scarpaci v.
Milwaukee County, 292 N.W.2d 816, 820 (Wis. 1980) (couching cause of action not in
property, but in "the personal right of the family of the deceased" to have a proper burial,
and basing damages on "mental suffering").
158. See, e.g., Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No. 97-0271-CV-W-6, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10307, at *11 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1998) (noting that Missouri has "abandoned the
,early fiction that the cause of action [for interference with the right of sepulchre] rested on
the infringement of a right of the nearest kin to the body"'). In reference to quasi-property
rights, Dean Prosser famously noted that "[ult seems reasonably obvious that such 'property'
is something evolved out of thin air to meet the occasion, and that in reality the personal
feelings of the survivors are being protected, under a fiction likely to deceive no one but a
lawyer." W.L. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 63 (5th ed. 1984).
159. See Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding a
constitutionally protected property interest in a decedent's body where there was
nonconsensual comeal removal); see also Whaley v. County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1117
(6th Cir. 1995) (determining that "the next of kin [have] a legitimate claim of entitlement
and thus a property interest in a dead relative's body, including the eyes"); see also
Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (indicating that next of kin had
rights under Ohio law to possess the decedent's body for burial purposes, as well as to make
an anatomical gift of the relative's organs).
160. See Sathyavaglswaran,287 F.3d at 793, 795-98 (despite label of quasi-property,
plaintiffs held sufficient rights with respect to the decedent's body materials as to have
property rights for due process protection analysis); see also Whaley, 58 F.3d at 1117
(reasoning that the rights granted under state law corresponded closely enough with the
traditional bundle of rights that comprise property); Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 481-82 (finding
the court did not need to decide whether the implicated interest was property, quasi-property
or not property). Moreover, the California Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff's
unrestricted right to use, control and dispose of his spleen under California law "are so akin
to property interests that it would be subterfuge to call them anything else." Moore v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 249 Cal. Rptr. 494, 505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988). However, on
appeal the California Supreme Court reversed on this point. Moore v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990).
16 1. See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, O1wnership of Human Tissue: A Proposalfor Federal
Recognition of Human Research Participants'Property Rights in Their Biological Material,
61 WASH. & LEE L. Rnv. 257, 345 (2004) (proposing federal legislation regulating the sale of
human tissue and establishing a tort of conversion to protect the rights of individuals in this
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However, few courts have recognized property rights in human body
materials since the rights granted under state law do not include the right to
sell or otherwise transfer the body. 12Instead,
the rights exist only to allow
proper burial of a corpse and compliance with public health statutes. The
ability of a decedent's next of kin to sell or generally transfer a decedent's
body materials has been found to be a critical-and conspicuously absentstick in the bundle of rights. Instead, property rights in human body
materials seem to emerge only after the materials have been transferred to a
63
commercial middleman.1

The California Supreme Court highlighted the tension created by legal
rules under which a third party can possess property rights in human body
materials, but the person from whose body they have been removed cannot.
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California,'64 the majority found
that the plaintiff, whose excised spleen and blood had been used to form the

context); see also Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey J. Price, First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn 't It
Time We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues, Cells, and Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP.
PROB. & fTR.J. 151, 168-71 (2002) (proposing implementation of a right of commerciality
with respect to excised body parts to resolve the issues presented in Moore and Hecht); see
also Remigius N. Nwabueze, Biotechnology and the New PropertyRegime in Human Bodies
and Body Parts, 24 Loy. L.A. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 19, 21 (2002) (arguing for recognition
of "a property interest in human corpses and tissue"). But see Lesley A. Sharp, The
Commodification of the Body and Its Parts, 29 ANN. REv. ANTHROPOLOGY 287, 296 (2000)
("Among the most disturbing historical trends is the tendency within the medical
marketplace to exploit the bodies of the poor and disenfranchised, where paupers frequently
emerge as being of greater worth dead than alive.").
162. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990)
(finding that plaintiff could not bring an action for conversion against medical researchers
for their use of his removed spleen, blood cells and other tissues in the development of a cell
line since he did not have property rights in the materials); see, e.g., Colavito v. N.Y. Organ
Donor Network, Inc., 860 N.E.2d 713, 719, 722 (N.Y. 2006) (finding a limited right in a
decedent's body to ensure proper burial is not a property right and does not provide a
plaintiff who is the intended recipient of a kidney that is misdirected a cause of action for
conversion of property); State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986) (noting that the
night to possess a decedent's body is "'for the purpose of burial, sepulture or other lawful
disposition"' (citing Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950))); Albrecht v.
Treon, 889 N.E.2d 120, 129 (Ohio 2008) (holding that under Ohio law, next of kin were
afforded only the right to inter or cremate a body after autopsy).
163. Upon transfer of a human body material from a clinic to a hospital, for example, it
is well-established that the materials are property.
164. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 492 (determining that there was no conversion claim for
use of the plaintiff's cells in medical research without permission because the applicable
state statute eliminates many traditional rights associated with "property," leaving the court
unconvinced "that what is left amounts to 'property' or 'ownership' for purposes of
conversion law").
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basis for a commercial cell line, had no property rights in the materials. 6 5
Justice Broussard, in a concurrence and dissent, noted that the defendant
medical center had property rights in those materials since it would
undoubtedly be able to maintain an action for conversion against a drug
company that removed the cells at issue firom the medical center without
authonization. 16Thus, the decision must "rest[] on the proposition that a
patient retains no ownership interest in a body part once the body part has
been removed from his or her body."'167 Human body materials here are
potentially the property of a third party, but not of the person from whom
68
the material was removed.1
This distinction is also reflected in the Revised Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act (RUAGA), 61 1 which has been adopted in thirty-nine
jurisdictions.170 Under RUAGA, donees of human body materials are
granted rights superior to that of third parties in the material;'17' for
example, a third party may not revoke the donation.17 2 However, these
165. Id.
166. Id at 501 (Broussard, J., concunring and dissenting).
167. Id.; see also id at 498 (Arabian, J., concurring) ("[T]he majority view is not
unmindful of the seeming injustice in a result that denies [Moore] a claim for conversion of
his body tissue, yet permits defendants to retain the fruits thereof.").
168. See also Hecht v. Cal. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283-84 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. 1993) (holding that a decedent had sufficient decision making authority in
his sperm to bequeath it to his girlfriend).
169. RUAGA § 14(h).
170. See National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Enactment
Status Map, ANATOMicALGiFTACT.ORG, http://www.anatomicalgiftact.org/DesktopDefault.
aspx?tabindex-2&tabid=72 (last visited Sept. 20, 2010) (listing the thirty-nine U.S.
jurisdictions that have adopted the RUAGA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). The states that have adopted the RUAGA are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New
Mexico, North Dakota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. The District of Columbia has also adopted it.
171. See RUAGA § 14(h) (describing the rights granted to donees of human body
materials). RUAGA provides that
the rights of the person to which a part passes ... are superior to the rights of all
others with respect to the part. The person may accept or reject an anatomical
upon the death of the donor
gift in whole or inpart.... If the gift is of a part. ...
and before embalming, burial, or cremation, [the donee] shall cause the part to
be removed without unnecessary mutilation.
Id
172. See id. § 8(a) ("[Iln the absence of an express, contrary indication by the donor, a
person other than the donor is barred from making, amending, or revoking an anatomical gift
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rights are not property rights, and the donee is given no remedy should the
transfer not occur.
Underlying much of the debate about human body materials is a
resistance to a one size fits all solution. Instead, it is becoming increasingly
obvious that in some instances we-both as individuals and through our
legal system-conceptualize our body materials as property and sometimes
as simply "not property." Academics have attempted to distinguish the two
categories 173 and have recognized that they are not fixed. Instead, at critical
moments, human body materials can move between these realms, as when
blood formed in an individual's body (not property) is removed and
donated to a clinic (potentially property), which then sells the blood to a
medical center (clearly property), which uses it in a transfusion for another
This adaptive approach to applying the
individual (not property).174
property/not property distinction raises many questions, among them: Who
can decide to move human body materials between these categories? At
what point is the transition complete? Who may hold title at any point the
material is property? How is title acquired? These questions do not have
simple answers. They help reveal, however, that the clear trend over the
past century has been to increasingly recognize at least the possibility that,
in certain circumstances, human body materials can and should be
understood as property.
B. Marketsfor Human Body MaterialsAre Growing and Changing
Science has created new conditions that the creators of traditional rules
concerning human body materials did not envision. Kidneys, hearts, lungs,
livers, pancreases, intestines, middle ears, corneas, skin, cardiovascular
tissue, bones, veins, cartilage, tendons, and ligaments are all transplantable
of a donor's body or part if the donor made an anatomical gift of the donor's body or
part.. .. )
173. See, e.g., Rao, supra note 146, at 365-400 (identifying the relevant divisions as
being whether the body is living or a corpse; whether the body is intact or materials have
been excised; and whether the body has been commercialized or is in a sphere of relational
privacy); Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REv. 195,
198-200 (1996) (categorizing human materials as either the object of rights (property) or the
subject of rights (legal actor)); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L.
REV. 957, 966 (1982) (arguing that it is "appropriate to call parts of the body property only
after they have been removed from the [intact bodily] system").
174. See, e.g., Ducor, supra note 173, at 219-24 (discussing the transition from legal
subject to object, as with death or the harvesting of human body materials, and the reverse,
as when an organ is transplanted to a new body or a child is born from a dead mother).
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today, and stem cells, blood, platelets, sperm, eggs, and embryos are all
transferable from one human body for use in another.175 In addition, recent
medical advances have expanded transplant opportunities to include whole
76
hand and face transplants.1
The resulting markets for these materials have matured before the

underlying legal issues have been resolved. In Garber17 7 and Green,17 1 for
example, the companies that purchased the blood products had no interest
in the details of state property law or federal tax law; they cared only that
Dorothy Garber and Margaret Cramer Green controlled access to
substances the companies wished to purchase. Moreover, the taxpayers did
not concern themselves with legal classifications until required to do so by
the Service. InI short, these cases involved the emergence of new markets
that required the development of tax79 classifications in the absence of
guidance from either tax or nontax law.'1
These markets, which are still developing, are driving our
understandings of human bodies. While the absence or existence of a
80
market value does not determine whether an item is or can be property,'
175.

See What Can Be Donated,

ORGANDoNOR.Gov,

http://www.organdonor.gov-

donation/what donate.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2010) (listing all organs and tissue except
sperm and eggs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also U.S. DEP'T. OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. & CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2006 ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES: NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC
REPORTS 3 (2008), available at http://www. cdc.gov/art/ART2006/508PDF/2006ARTCoverNational .pdf (discussing the transfer of fertilized human eggs).
176. See Jon W. Jones et al., Successful Hand Transplantation: One Year Follow-Up,
J. MED. 468, 469-70 (2000) (discussing the protocol for human hand
transplantation); see also Omar Ford, 1st Near-Total Face Transplant in U.S. 'Definitely a
Triumph,' MED. DEVICE DAILY, Dec. 22, 2008, at 1 (hypothesizing that facial transplants

343 NEW ENG.

will become more common).

177. United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 94 (5th Cir. 1979); see supra notes 4, 10110 and accompanying text (describing the legal issues faced and conclusions reached in the
Garbercase).
178. Green v. Commn'r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1232 (1980); see supra notes 113-22 and
accompanying text (describing the legal issues faced and conclusions reached in the Green
case).
179. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 95-1 00; Green, 74 T.C. 1229 1233-3 8.
180. See, e.g., Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 791 (9th Cir. 2002)
(dissociating markets and property on the basis of Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation
and Justice Holmes's dissent in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press). In Phillips,
the Supreme Court made clear that it has "never held that a physical item is not 'property'
simply because it lacks a positive economic or market value." Phillips v. Wash. Legal
Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169 (1988). In InternationalNews Service, Justice Holmes noted that
"[piroperty, a creation of law, does not arise from value.' Int'l News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918).
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Margaret Jane Radin has observed that the very possibility of a market can
transform that which previously was not property into property.1 8 In any
event, the emergence of new markets requires solutions to the new tax
issues these markets create. This is true regardless of whether nontax law
has finally resolved the underlying questions about whether, when, and how
human body materials can be property.
V Developing a Framework
Any framework for taxing transfers of human body materials must
take into account the complexity of the issues presented: No single
characterization of these materials as property or not is appropriate across
the variety of situations in which the issue arises. However, despite the
complexity and inexact fit with the current statutory framework, the
immediate tax treatment of these materials is more appropriately handled
from within the current tax regimes than by development of an entirely new
system tailored to the situation. To this end, based on the existing law and
associated cultural understandings of our bodies, we can derive three
principles distinguishing transfers of human body materials as the provision
of services, as property, and as simply not property. These principles, then,
provide the appropriate tax treatment of the most common transfers of these
materials. Until such time as the Service issues a new and binding ruling
retracting Revenue Ruling 162 and Congress passes the legislation
necessary to fully implement this approach, courts addressing the question
of taxpayer liability in connection with these transfers should follow these
guidelines.
A. No Uniform Characterizationof Human Body Materials
Human beings are legal subjects, and their bodies and body materials
As subject, the body is the physical
are potentially legal objects.
embodiment of the self, inextricable from our very being. It is potentially a
laborer, performing services, and cannot itself be property. But human
bodies-particularly when viewed as a composite of the material they

18 1. See Margaret Jane Radin, Cloning and Commodif/ication, 53

HASTINGS L.J. 1123,

1124 (2002) (using the example of the commodification of human eggs between her early
writings and the twenty-first century).
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include and produce-can also be seen as factories producing commodities
or as the source of spare parts available for occasional sale.
State law has attempted to deal with these multiple roles by declining
to apply the label "property" to human body materials when held by the
individual whose body produced them. At most, it has afforded "quasiproperty" status in the limited context of the disposal of corpses 1 2 or vague
"superior rights" to an individual designated as the donee of a body
material. 183 However, in commercial contexts-for example, the transfer of
blood from a blood bank to a medical center or with respect to spleen cells
held by a medical center-treatment as property seems unproblematic and
courts have not hesitated to endorse this characterization. The law,
including tax law, has inched toward recognizing that differences in
contexts can and should play a key role in the laws governing the transfer of
human body materials.
B. Despite Complications, Can Make Sense Within Current Tax
Framework
In an ideal world, Congress would devise a sound, coherent and
comprehensive treatment of the full range of issues related to the tax
treatment of transfers of human body materials. No such solution, however,
is likely to emerge soon as the complexity of the problem and the reality of
the deep underlying philosophical debates pose obstacles to such resolution.
It is also unlikely that a legislative fix-even if achieved-would work well
in this area: Congress, especially when acting quickly, has often failed in
its efforts to graft new tax systems onto the existing tax regime.'8
182. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text (discussing the property rights to a
deceased's body by their next of kin).
183. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing pre-death anatomical gifts).
184. For example, in 1976 Congress enacted a "generation skipping transfer tax" to
supplement the gift and estate tax systems and ensure all property is subject to tax at least
once in each generation. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub L. No. 94-455, §§ 2001-09, 90
Stat. 1520, 1846-1905 (reforming tax laws). However, the new transfer tax was only
incompletely integrated with the existing systems, and in 1986 it was repealed, retroactive to
the law's original implementation date. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-5 14,
§§ 1431-1433, 100 Stat. 2085, 2717-32. While new provisions became effective as of
October 1985, they have required later modifications to bring them into accord with the
existing estate and gift tax systems. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34,
§ 511, 111 Stat. 788, 860-61; Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101239. § 7811, 103 Stat. 2106, 2406-12. Moreover, transfers between 1976 and 1985 that
were intended to be subject to the tax have instead avoided the tax entirely.
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In any event, current U.S. tax law is flexible enough to permit
development of a sound system of taxation of transfers of human body
While the
materials without requiring legislative intervention.
subject/object duality of human beings and our body materials is unique in
the law, there is precedent for differential tax consequences depending on
the context in which a transfer occurs. Moreover, tax law is already
headed-albeit haltingly and incompletely-in the right direction. As a
general matter, the law already recognizes the critical notion that human
body materials need not be treated as property or not-property in an all-ornothing categorization. The law in this area need not be created anew.
Instead, building on the already existing movement towards contextualism,
it need only be further adapted, clarified, and refined.
C Guiding Principles

The foregoing review of current tax jurisprudence and broader state
law jurisprudence regarding human body materials is consistent with
several principles that, together, provide a context-specific basis for
characterizing these materials for tax purposes. First, intact living bodies
are subjects, and thus transactions with respect to them are only taxable as
services. Second, human body materials removed from a living person and
transferred in a commercial transaction are property; to the extent they are
transferred gratuitously or disposed of, they are not property. Finally, a
cadaver disposed of by burial or other traditional means does not constitute
or give rise to property rights; only if it or its constituent parts are sold
commercially would it or they become property. Underlying these
principles is a rejection of the binary approach which views all transactions
in human body materials as either transfers of property or as the
performance of a service that finds expression in current tax jurisprudence.
Intact living bodies are legal subjects. To the extent the human body
materials involved in a transaction are part of an integrated living human,
Instead, the transaction is appropriately
they are not property.185
characterized as the performance of services and taxed as such. Here, the
tax treatment is no different than that of income from massages,
185. See supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process protection of an individual's exclusive right to possess and control
his body and to prevent unauthorized physical invasions); see also Rao, supra note 146, at
454 (arguing that intact, living human bodies are protected under the rubric of privacy, not
under property law).
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prostitution, or physical therapy, where a taxpayer uses his or her body to
perform services in exchange for payment.
Excised body materials transferred in commercial transactions are
property. As a predicate to finding property in human body materials
from a living person, the material must first be excised.116 Only once the
material is removed from its intact, living state is it possible to have
property rights in these human body materials. This distinction is evident
in jurisprudence recognizing third party property rights in human body
materials, where no such rights would be possible in an intact, living
87
human body.'

However, not all excised human body materials are property.
Radhika Rao distinguishes between the legal treatment of human body
materials that become property because they are commodified and those
excluded from treatment as property by their transfer as part of an
"intimate and consensual relationship[]" marked by "relational
privacy."' 88 Similarly, one principle distinguishing human body materials
as property or not is between excised body materials involved in
commercial transactions-human body materials as commodities-and
89
those transferred gratuitously or disposed of at death.1
This distinction can be seen in jurisprudence denying property rights
in instances where human body materials are excised for therapeutic
purposes even though the medical researchers involved may gain a
property interest in the very same materials, 90 and in the denial of
property rights where materials are transferred for personal incorporation
into an individual's body. 19 1 Moreover, it is consistent with the approach

186. See id. (observing that only once human body materials are excised from a living
body are they appropriately protected by property rights rather than the right of privacy); see
also Courtney S. Campbell, Body, Self and the Property Paradigm,22(5) HASTiNGS CENT-ER
REP. 34, 35-36 (1992) (asserting that the concept of the human body as property relies on the
alienability of body parts).
187. See supra notes 145-72 and accompanying text (discussing the multifaceted
problem of the appropriate tax treatment of transfers of human body materials).
188. Rao, supra note 146, at 446.
189. This principle requires valuation of human body materials only when they are
transferred in a commercial transaction.
190. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text (discussing Moore v. Regents of
the University of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)).
191. See, e.g., Colavito v. N.Y. Organ Donor Network, 860 N.E.2d 713, 722 (N.Y.
2006) (rejecting plaintiffs cause of action for conversion when a kidney intended for
transplantation into him was instead transplanted into another person due to plaintiffs lack
of property rights in the kidney).
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of RUAGA, in which a donee receives something less than property rights
in the human body materials he or she is designated to receive.' 92
1. Tax Consequences of Gratuitous Transfers
Once a distinction is drawn between excised human body materials

that have entered the stream of commerce (as in Garber193 and Green194 )
and those that are transferred in a gratuitous transaction (as in Lary,'9
Revenue Ruling 162, 196 and G.C.M. 3641l8197), only those in the former
category should be considered property. Thus, transfers of human body
materials should not be subject to gift tax because they do not involve
property, and no gift tax return need be filed upon their transfer. This
approach may seem counterintuitive at first blush because gratuitous
transfers generally are the very transactions subject to gift tax.' 98 This
result, however, is not unprecedented. In several places, the Code
explicitly or implicitly treats intimate transfers as nontaxable; for
example:
* property and labor may be shared or transferred within the

marital unit without taxation;199

192.

See supra notes

169-72 and accompanying text (discussing RUAGA).

193. See United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing taxpayer's
conviction for tax evasion based on failure to report income from sale of blood plasma);
supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Garber, 607 F.2d 92
(5th Cir. 1979)).
194. See Green v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1235 (1980) ("[W]e find that petitioner was
in the trade or business of selling blood plasma."); see also supra notes 113-25 and
accompanying text (discussing Green).
195. See Lary v. United States, 787 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11Ith Cir. 1986) (disallowing tax
deduction for donation of blood); see also supra notes 23, 111, 127-31 and accompanying
text (discussing Lary).
196. See Rev. Rul. 162, 1953-2 C.B. 127 ("Furnishing blood for a transfusion, or to a
blood bank, is analogous to the rendering of a personal service by the donor rather than a
contribution of 'property."'); see also supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing
Revenue Ruling 162); supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (same).
197. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36418, supra note 89, at *3 (arguing that a "donation
of mother's milk is clearly a donation of property"); see also supra notes 14-18 and
accompanying text (discussing the limited legal guidance available on these issues); supra
notes 100-0 1 (discussing unclear guidance from the IRS and courts).
198. See I.R.C. § 2501(a)(1) (2006) (imposing a tax "on the transfer of property by
gift").
199. See id. § 2523 (granting deductions for transfers within marital unit).
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property may be transferred 200
tax-free between former spouses

*

the annual exclusion from the gift tax is a recognition that most
personal gifts should not be taxed;201 and

*

even lavish wedding ceremonies
paid for by parents are not
202

within one year after divorce ;

pursued by the Service as gifts.

Moreover, donations of human body materials should not be eligible
for a charitable donation deduction under current tax law under this
framework. This outcome is appropriate conceptually; only in very limited
circumstances (and as the result of policy-oriented statutory provisions) are
amounts never taken into income in the first instance allowed as deductions
to offset income. 0 Of course, if it is determined that, as a matter of policy,
200. See id § 1041 (providing that no gain or loss will be recognized under these
circumstances).
201. See id. § 2503(b)(1) (allowing for the exclusion of up to $10,000, as annually
adjusted for inflation). This exclusion is not available in the commercial context. See id
§ 102(c)(1) (disallowing gift treatment in transfers from an employer to an employee due to
the fundamentally commercial nature of the relationship).
202. While not explicitly excluded from taxation under the Code, it is likely these
expenditures fall either under a "traditional familial matters" exception or are excepted as a
payment primarily for the benefit of the parent. See Dickman v. Comm'r, 465 U.S. 330, 341
(1984), which states that:
[It is not uncommon for parents to provide their adult children with such things
as the use of cars or vacation cottages, simply on the basis of the family
relationship. We assume that the focus of the Internal Revenue Service is not on
such traditional familial matters. When the government levies a gift tax on
routine neighborly or familial gifts, there will be enough time to deal with such a
case.
Id.; see also Stem v. United States, 436 F.2d 1327, 1330 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding, prior
to the enactment of I.R.C. § 2501l(a)(5), that the taxpayer did not make taxable gifts when
she contributed to election campaigns of public officials since she was "motivated by [her]
desire to promote a slate of candidates that would protect and advance her personal and
property interests").
203. One such exception is that of charitable contributions of qualified appreciated
stock. See .R.C. § 170(e)(5)(A) (allowing full deduction for qualified appreciated stock).
The full fair market value of such stock may be deducted, even though the taxpayer is never
subject to tax on the capital gain inherent in such securities. See id. (providing the tax
treatment of qualified appreciated stock). However, this exception was explicitly enacted to
encourage high income taxpayers to make charitable donations of this property. H.R. Rep.
No. 432, pt. 2 (1984); JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION STAFF, 98th Cong., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF REVENuE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
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(Comm. Print 1984); see generally Lisa Milot, The Case Against Tax Incentives for Organ
Transfers, 45 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 67 (2008) (discussing why no charitable donation
deduction is currently available for donations of human body materials and arguing against
the provision of tax incentives for this purpose more generally).
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a tax incentive for such transfers should be provided, a specific provision
affording such an incentive can be added to the Code. However, absent
such addition, no tax benefit for a donation would be available.
2. Tax Consequences of Commercial Transactions
Excised human body materials transferred in commercial transactions
should be considered property, with the gain from their transfer subject to
income tax. In determining the appropriate characterization of the income,
excised human body materials should be considered capital assets unless
fitting one of the eight exceptions to the capital asset definition.2 0 To the
extent a taxpayer is considered to be in the trade or business of selling his
or her human body materials, payroll taxes should be due on the proceeds
from their sale as well.20
Jay Soled persuasively argues that human eggs do not fit any of the
exceptions to capital asset treatment provided in the Code.2 0 First, he finds
that they are clearly not depreciable or real property, notes receivable, or
Next, he concludes that they cannot be
government publications. 0
considered to be held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of business
since women do not hold their eggs primarily for sale, do not
"merchandise"' their eggs, and are generally limited to selling their eggs no
more than two or three times in their lifetime so that sales cannot be in the
ordinary course of business. 0 Moreover, the purpose and wording of the
exception for self-created copyrights and similar works excludes eggs from
204. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (listing exceptions to the definition of
capital asset).
205. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing payroll tax provisions). The
Green court notes in summary fashion that Dorothy Green did pay these taxes on her income
from sales of her blood. Green v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1234-38; see supra note 115 and
accompanying text (discussing the IRS stance in Green).
206. See Soled, supra note 135, at 933 (contending that human eggs do not fit within
exceptions to capital asset treatment). This accords with the Service's observation in
G.C.M. 36418 that mother's milk should be considered a capital asset since it does not meet
any of the exceptions that would make it ordinary income property. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 36418, supra note 89, at *7 n.2 ("Since the milk in question does not seem to fall
within any exception under Code § 122 1, it is a capital asset."); see also Note, supra note 18,
at 857 (concluding that nonregenerative human body materials are capital assets).
207. See Soled, supra note 135, at 933 (noting that human eggs fit in none of these
categories).
208. See id at 933-36 (concluding that human eggs cannot be held primarily for sale in
the ordinary course of business).
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By extension of this analysis, then, all human body
its coverage.'0
materials that constitute property should usually be regarded as capital
assets 2.
However, in a limited number of cases human body materials may
qualify as property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of a trade or business .2 1' This exception from capital asset treatment
distinguishes between ordinary profits generated by a taxpayer's business
and those that result from the appreciation of property over a period of
time.2 12 Individuals who create property for rapid resale are thus prevented
from receiving the benefit of preferential capital gains tax rates, since
"[tlhere is little to distinguish their efforts from those [persons] performing

services.

2 13

The exception requires that the assets be (1) held primarily for sale,
(2) to customers, (3) in the ordinary course of the taxpayer's trade or
business .2 14 i Malat v. Riddell,215 the Supreme Court has held that the first
requirement be read literally: "'[P]rimarily,' for purposes of the statute,
means 'of first importance' or 'principally. "'2 16 The requirement is
intended to distinguish sales by dealers or merchants, on the one hand, and
those by investors or securities traders, on the other.21 In addition, the
second requirement has been interpreted to include any purchaser of the
209. See id. at 939-40 (stating that human eggs are not a copyright or similar property).
210. Id. At the time Soled was writing, exceptions (6)-(8) were not in the Code.
Ticket to Work and Work incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-170, § 532,
113 Stat. 1860, 1928-29 (adding I.R.C. § § 1221 (a)(6)-(8)). However, eggs are clearly not
financial instruments or hedging transactions, and it would be a stretch to label a taxpayer's
own human body materials as supplies used or consumed in the ordinary course of the
taxpayer's business. Given the narrow scope of the exception, such an extension is
inappropriate.
211. See I.R.C. § 122 1(a)(1) (2006) (stating that the term "capital asset" means property
held by the taxpayer, but does not include "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business").
212. See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 572 (1966) ("The purpose of the statutory
provision with which we deal is to differentiate between the 'profits and losses arising from
the everyday operation of a business' on the one hand and 'the realization of appreciation in
value accrued over a substantial period of time' on the other." (citations omitted)).
213. Howard J. Rothman, et al., Portfolio 561-2nd: Capital Assets § WV.A. (B3NA).
214. See I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (listing exceptions to the definition of capital asset).
215. Mallat, 383 U.S. at 572 (requiring that the "primarily for sale" element be read
literally).
216. See id. ("A literal reading of the statute is consistent with this legislative
purpose.").
217. See BoRkis BiTrKER & LAWRENCE LoKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES, AND GiFrs 47.2.1. (2005) (discussing I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1)).
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taxpayer's assets other than purchasers from securities or commodities
traders.' 18 Thus, assets sold by individuals who are best characterized as
merchants or dealers are potentially covered by this exception, while those
sold by investors or traders are not.
Determining whether any sales are "within the ordinary course of [the
taxpayer's] trade or business" is based on a consideration of factors."'
Many of the cases interpreting the provision have been decided by the Fifth
Circuit, 121which

hsdeveloped a multi-factor test with the factors weighted

differently depending upon the specific facts of the case .22 '1 None of the
factors is controlling. 2 Because the factors were primarily developed in
cases dealing with the subdivision and sale of real property, it is important
to look at the underlying principles being reviewed by courts before
applying the factors to a novel asset, such as human body materials.
In United States v. Winthrop,22 1 the taxpayer subdivided and sold real
property over a period of thirty years.2 2 While he initially reported the
22
gains as capital gains, he later began reporting them as ordinary income. 1
After his death, his executrix filed a claim for refund, alleging that the sales
actually produced capital gain income.2 2 The Fifth Circuit held that the

proceeds from the sales were ordinary income .227

It

distilled a seven-part

test from prior caselaw to differentiate sales of real property that qualify for
capital asset treatment from those properly taxed at ordinary income tax
rates, considering:
218. Id.; see also Guardian Indus. Corp. v. Comrn'r, 97 T.C. 308, 317 n.2 (1991)
(stating that, other than in the dealer/trader area, the term "customer" has been given such a
broad interpretation so as to be virtually meaningless).
219. See Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) (noting that the determination is based on multiple
factors).
220. Many of the cases are originally decided by the Tax Court. Tax Court cases may
be appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
221. See BiedenharnRealty Co., 526 F.2d at 415 ("No one set of criteria are applicable
to all economic structures. Moreover, within a collection of tests, individual factors have
varying weights and magnitudes, depending on the facts of the case.").
222. See, e.g., id. ("[Elach case must be decided on its own peculiar facts. Specific
factors, or combinations of them are not necessarily controlling.").
223. See United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 912 (5th Cir. 1969) (concluding that
taxpayer was not entitled to capital gains treatment sale of land acquired, subdivided, and
sold over a period of years).
224. See id. at 906 (discussing taxpayer's purchases and sales of land).
225. See id. at 907 (discussing taxpayer's reporting position).
226. See id. (discussing claim by taxpayer's executrix for tax refund).
227. See id. at 912 (denying capital gains treatment for the income at issue).
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(1) the nature and purpose of the acquisition of the property and the
duration of the ownership; (2) the extent and nature of the taxpayer's
efforts to sell the property; (3) the number, extent, continuity and
substantiality of the sales; (4) the extent of subdividing, developing, and
advertising to increase sales; (5) the use of a business office for the sale
of the property; (6) the character and degree of supervision or control
exercised by the taxpayer over any representative selling the property;
to the
sands (7) the time and effort the taxpayer habitually devoted
Ultimately it emphasized that it is whether the sales were in the ordinary
course of the taxpayer's business that mattered. 2 Sales of human body
materials should be evaluated on the same fact-specific basis as other assets
in determining whether they fit this exception to capital asset treatment.
While no single weighting of factors is possible across all cases, the
Fifth Circuit has recognized that the most important of the Winthrop factors
is "the frequency and substantiality of taxpayer's sales.",2 30 Where the
taxpayer's sales "extend over a long period of time and are especially
23
numerous, the likelihood of capital gains is very slight indeed." '
Moreover, the activity is apt to be found substantial where the income
received from the activity represents a high proportion of the taxpayer's
In the context of sales of human body
gross income for the year.2 3
materials, then, a taxpayer is likely to be found to be engaged in a trade or
business where the sales are not isolated or occasional, but are instead part
of a pattern of commercial activity over an extended time period and where
the proceeds represent a substantial portion of the taxpayer's income.
In addition, under this test, the purpose for which the material was
The Winthrop court
excised from the body should be considered.
considered the acquisition purpose and holding duration factors to be
considered in differentiating capital assets from ordinary income
property. 3 Where the property is acquired for a business purpose, or has
228. Idat 910.
229. See id. at 912 ("[The sales were not only ordinary, they were the sole object of
[the taxpayer's] business.").
230. See Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 819 (1976) (referring to this as "the most important of Winthrop's
factors").
23 1. Id.
232. See United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 907 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that

proceeds from the taxpayer's sales of the real property in question constituted 52.4% of his
gross income over a twelve-year period).
233. See id. at 9 10 (listing relevant factors).
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acquired such a purpose by the time of sale,23 and is disposed of relatively
quickly, it is more likely that the asset is not a capital asset. 23 5 Since human
body materials are not potentially property until removed from a living
body, 3 it is not the original purpose of the material within the human body
that is critical; instead, it is the purpose for which the material was excised.
In the case of materials removed solely for commercial (as opposed to
therapeutic or donative) purposes, the excision should be understood as an
acquisition for a business purpose-sale. Because human body materials
do not appreciate in value after removal from a living body-and in fact are
generally only usable within a short time period thereafter unless
appropriately preserved-removal for "linvestment"t purposes is highly
unlikely. Moreover, sale within a reasonable period of time after excision
should provide further evidence of a business purpose to the acquisition of
the material outside the body.
Other factors to be considered within the specific sphere of human
body materials, based on the factors for real property set forth by the
Winthrop court, but reduced to general principles to apply more broadly,
include whether the taxpayer invested in "improvements" to the materials to
make them more marketable (e.g., ingesting supplements and special diets,
or undergoing testing to enhance the value of the material); whether the
taxpayer claimed business expenses (e.g., mileage or a home office
deduction) to offset the gain; and the time and effort devoted to the sales.23
For a material classified as a capital asset, the tax rate for gains
depends upon the material's holding period. 3 As noted by the Service in
G.C.M. 36418, the time period could begin to run either upon production of
the material in a human body or upon excision .23 9 This distinction is
234. See, e.g., Redwood Empire Savings & Loan Assoc. v. Comm'r, 628 F.2d 516, 518
(9th Cir. 1980) (finding intent at the time of sale to be determinative); Van Sickle v.
Comm'r, Y.C. Memo 1988-115, at 10 (relying on Redwood Empire Savings & Loan for this
proposition).
23 5. See Winthrop, 417 F.2d at 910 (noting time and effort devoted to sales as a factor
in analysis).
236. Or, in the case of a corpse, until transferred in a commercial transaction.
237. See Winthrop, 417 F.2d at 910 (listing factors).
238. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (discussing capital asset taxation
rates).
239. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36418, supra note 89, at *7 n.2 (discussing holding
periods for mother's milk and for blood). The Service noted:
Ordinarily the holding period for mother's milk would be less than [the required
long-term holding period] whether the period includes production time .. . or
starts at the time of withdrawal. It is arguable that the holding period [for
mother's milk] should start at the time of withdrawal because at that time the
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important because human body materials are typically (and for the most
part necessarily) transferred immediately upon excision from the body.
Thus, if the holding period commences at excision (the moment the
materials are first characterized as property), any gain can only be shortterm. However, if commencing at production, the holding period for
materials existent in a human body for more than one year prior to excision
and transfer would be sufficient to afford them long-term capital gain
treatment.
Both Soled, with respect specifically to eggs, and the author of the
1973 Note, more generally, assume without rigorous analysis that the
holding period for human body materials should begin to run from the time
of the material's formation in the body.2140 However, classifying human
body materials as long-term capital assets ignores the reality that, prior to
excision and commercialization, they are simply not assets and thus cannot
properly be considered to be held within the meaning of the tax statute.
Moreover, it unnecessarily complicates the analysis to consider them as
such, by requiring that each extracted cell be classified by age, with a
precision that is not always possible. Finally, assigning a holding period
that begins only with commercialization after excision to all human body
materials means that all such materials are treated equally under tax law
rather than arbitrarily favoring some materials (for example, eggs) over
others (like sperm).
Ultimately, the principle that human body materials once excised from
a living body are only properly considered property upon
commercialization embodies the idea that, given the lack of consensus over
whether or when human body materials should be property, it is most
appropriate to recognize that many transfers of human body materials are
milk is property separate and apart from the person producing it.
Id. Further, it observed:
[T]he greater part of whole blood (by volume) has a life of less than six months
in the body. Therefore, if sold upon withdrawal, the sale arguably would not
give rise to long-term capital gain whether the holding period includes the
lifetime of the blood in the body or begins at the time of withdrawal when it is
property separate and apart from the person.
Id at *8 n.3.
240. See Soled, supra note 135, at 944 & n.143 (making no general statement but
concluding that, because women selling their eggs have had them since birth and must have
reached the age of majority by the time of sale, any gain resulting from their disposition is
properly characterized as long-term capital gain); Note, supra note 18, at 856-57, 864
(asserting without analysis that gain from the sale of human body materials would be
"accorded long term capital treatment")-
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transfers of a part of the donor's self, not of his or her property. Only once
commercialized do these materials become property, with any resulting
gain subject to income taxation and no gift tax consequences. In most such
instances, the materials should be considered capital assets, and gains from
their transfer should be classified as short-term capital gain.
3. Cadavers (And Their Constituent Parts) That Are Buried or Otherwise
Disposed of in Traditional Ways Should Not Be ConsideredProperty
Cadavers that are buried or otherwise disposed of in traditional ways
are not property. This principle recognizes the legal classification of
decedents' bodies as other than property or as quasi-property-but in any
24
event as nonproperty. 41On the other hand, if a cadaver or its parts are
transferred commercially, they would become property and be subject to
the same rules concerning capital asset or ordinary income property
treatment as human body materials excised from living beings.
Unlike human body materials from a living body that are sold, those
sold upon a decedent's death raise a second set of issues. As a technical
matter, only the value of property held by the decedent at the moment of his
or her death is includible in the value of an estate.2 4 Because human body
materials are part of an intact body and not yet property at the moment of
death, under this rule no amount would be includible in a decedent's estate
even if all the saleable materials were sold immediately thereafter,
becoming property after the moment of death. This result makes little
sense. If in fact a cadaver or its materials are sold, they are no less property
transferred firomn the decedent's estate than other assets that are included in
the value of the decedent's estate.
Thus, proper estate tax treatment requires that the property status of
material sold posthumously relate back to the moment of death, being
deemed to be property at that moment. As a practical matter, because
human body materials must be transferred immediately after death to be
usable for transplantation or research, whether a cadaver or any materials
24 1. See supra notes 150-58 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of corpses
as quasi-property). However, Radhika Rao argues that cadavers should be protected under a
property rubric instead of a privacy one due to their status as 'quasi-property." See Rao,
supra note 146, at 364 ("[W]hen the human body is fragmented from the person ...we
should employ the property paradigm."). As I have discussed, though, quasi-property status
is something less than property and is not a majority approach. See supra notes 149-58 and
accompanying text (discussing cases).
242. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing the estate tax).
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therefrom were commercialized would be known long before the estate tax
If they were, their value would be included in the
return was due.24
If not, they would be
decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes."
of
human body materials
sale
from
the
posthumous
excluded. The proceeds
would not be subject to income tax, since their basis would be their value in
the decedent's estate, and thus equal to the sale price. As a result, in that
instance there would be no gain to tax, preventing double taxation (income
and estate) of these proceeds.
D. Application to Common Scenarios
Application of these three principles to five common transfers of
human body materials reveals how an adaptive application of tax law
principles in this area can generate sound results. These now-common
transfers involve (1) surrogacy arrangements, (2) sales of eggs, (3) sales of
plasma and sperm, (4) black market kidney sales, and (5) kidney donations.
1. Surrogacy Arrangements
Surrogacy, even where the pregnancy is achieved using the surrogate's
egg, is properly characterized as a service for federal tax purposes.24 This
accords with legal proscriptions against sales of human beings, as well as a
broader cultural understanding that the "product" exchanging hands, here a
baby, is not property. This is the human body as a laborer in its most direct
form.
As a result, proceeds received by the surrogate mother are subject to
taxation at ordinary income tax rates. However, since in at least most
instances the surrogate mother will not be an employee of the clinic or
individual employing her, she may deduct her ordinary and necessary

243. Unless extended, the estate tax return is due nine months after the taxpayer's
death. Treas. Reg. § 20.6081-1(b).
244. See I.R.C. § 2031 (2006) (stating that in general, "[tlhe value of the gross estate of
the decedent shall be determined by including. ., the value at the time of his death of all
property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated").
245. See generally Crawford, supra note 142 (explaining the appropriate taxation of
proceeds from surrogacy); James Edward Maule, Federal Tax Consequences of Surrogate

Motherhood,60

TAXES

656 (1982) (same).
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business expenses prior to determining her tax due .246 Self-employment
taxes may also be due on the proceeds. 4
2. Sales of Eggs
Once removed from a woman's body and transferred in a commercial
transaction, eggs are property. Specifically, eggs are capital assets because
they do not fit any of the exceptions to this classification provided in the
Code.24 8 Although all of the eggs a woman will ever have are in existence
in her body at birth,2 4 the holding period would not commence until they
were extracted and commercialized. As a result, they would be properly
categorized as short-term capital assets. Only if a woman is able to
establish specific capital expenditures will she have a basis in the eggs, as
her acquisition cost is zero dollars. Thus, in almost all instances the entire
proceeds from the sale of eggs are taxable at ordinary income tax rates.
Here, the human body is acting as a repository of spare parts which may
upon occasion be sold.
3. Sales of Plasmaand Sperm
Like eggs, once removed from the body and sold, plasma and sperm
would be property. Moreover, in instances in which they were sold as spare
parts they would be properly characterized as capital assets .25 0 As with
eggs, any gain from their sale would be short-term capital gain and taxable
at ordinary income tax rates. Any amounts the taxpayer could prove he or
she expended specifically to build a supply of plasma or sperm for sale
would add to his or her basis in the material and reduce the taxable gain
accordingly.

246. See Maule, supra note 245, at 657 (noting that a woman could deduct ordinary and
necessary business expenses under these circumstances).
247. See Crawford, supra note 142, at 18 (discussing the tax consequences of surrogacy
arrangements); Maule, supra note 245, at 657 (same).
248. See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text (discussing capital asset
definition).
249. See Soled, supra note 135, at 944 n. 143 ("Donors are born with their eggs.").
250. See supra notes 211-16 and accompanying text (discussing capital asset
definition).
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However, sperm and plasma both may be sold as often as twice each
week.25 Under these circumstances, it is possible that these human body
materials may properly be regarded as property held primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of a trade or business; here, the human
body is acting as a factory, producing commodities for sale on the market.
As with other manufacturers, the products produced should be considered
as exceptions to the definition of capital assets.
A taxpayer who sells his sperm may have ordinary income where the
sales occur once or twice each week and constitute a substantial portion of
his income. This may occur, for example, with taxpayers who elect to be
"'open 113" donors and, thus, may earn $400-$ 1000 per week from such
sales.25 In order to sell sperm this frequently, the taxpayer would need to
abstain from outside sex to increase the concentration of the sperm
present;21 such abstinence could properly be deemed to be an
"improvement" to the product. In addition, testing of the material is a
further improvement that is required prior to compensation by a clinic.2 5
Similarly, sales of plasma on a weekly or bi-weekly basis may produce
ordinary income if constituting a trade or business of the taxpayer based on:
the frequency and substantiality of sales; the extraction of the plasma with
the intent of sale; improvements made in the form of the ingestion of
supplements or a specific diet to affect the quality of the plasma; evidence
of a business intent by the taxpayer as with, for example, claimed mileage
deductions; and the time and effort invested by the taxpayer.
In Green, in fact, the taxpayer reported her income from selling her
plasma as income from a trade or business, and neither the Service nor the
Applying the revised
court disagreed with this characterization .2 5
251. See supranotes 26-27 (discussing how often sperm and plasma may be donated).
252. See Rebecca Said, Earn $400 to $1,000 a Month as a Sperm Donor,
Associatedcontent.com, http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/401791I/eamn_400_to_10
00_-a month-as-a-sperm.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (discussing this type of sperm
donor) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). "Open ID" or "Identity Release"
donors agree to allow their adult offspring to contact them. Such donors may be paid $500
per sale. Id. However, even donors electing for confidentiality may meet this substantiality
requirement, depending on their income from other sources. Id
253. See, e.g., GIVF Cyrobank Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 27 (discussing
requirements for sperm donation).
254. See, e.g., Become a Donor, FAiRFAX CRYOBANK, http://www.fairfaxcryobank.
comfBecomeAdonor.shtml (last visited Sept. 23, 2010) (listing sperm quality testing and
medical infectious disease testing prior to acceptance of the first specimen from a donor,
then blood testing at three month intervals prior to the release of samples from quarantine)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
255. See Green v. Comrn'r, 74 T.C. 1229, 1235 (1980) (agreeing that the income from
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Winthrop factors above illuminates this characterization: The taxpayer had
plasmapheresis performed ninety-five times in a single year for the sole
purpose of selling her plasma; she did, in fact, sell it each time; the
proceeds from the sales comprised 60% of her income in the year in
question; she ingested supplements and a high protein diet to improve the
quality of her plasma; she claimed business deductions for these products;
and she traveled forty miles (round trip) for each sale.25
Once such human body materials are classified as noncapital assets,
the proceeds from their sale, after reduction for the associated ordinary and
necessary business expenses,25 would be subject to tax at ordinary income
tax rates. Moreover, they would be subject to payroll taxes either as
employee or self-employment income.
4. Black Market Kidney Sales

At this time, sales of kidneys are not legal in the United States or most
other countries . 25 ' However, even proceeds received from illegal activities
are taxable income to the extent they represent gain .259 Thus, black market
sales of kidneys and other human body materials are subject to the same tax
treatment as legal sales of those materials would be.
A kidney, once excised and entered into the stream of commerce,
would be property. Because it does not fit any of the exceptions to capital
asset treatment, the kidney would be classified as a capital asset, and its
holding period would be short-term. A U.S. taxpayer who sold his or her
kidney would owe tax at ordinary income tax rates on the proceeds from the
sale, reducible only by any basis he or she can prove in the kidney.
Nonresident aliens selling their kidneys in the United States would not be
260
subject to U.S. income taxation on the transaction.
sale of blood plasma arose from taxpayer's trade or business).
256. See id. at 1230-32 (describing taxpayer's blood plasma sale activities).
257. See id. at 1236-37 (describing taxpayer's deductions). The taxpayer in Green was
allowed business deductions for, inter alia, "special drugs" and high protein foods. See id.
(approving deductions). Because the court found that these substances were necessitated by
the taxpayer's business of selling her plasma, the court held that, to the extent they exceeded
her personal needs and were properly substantiated, they were deductible. Id
258. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the ban on the sale of organs
for transplantation in the United States).
259. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting taxability of illegal gains).
260. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (noting the rule that sales and services
performed by nonresidents in the United States are not subject to income taxation under the
Internal Revenue Code).
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5. Kidney Donations
One important application of the principles developed here involves
the tax treatment of gifts and donations of human body materials. If a
kidney is viewed as property, then gift tax would be due, for example, upon
its uncompensated transfer between a parent and a child, unless eligible for
the annual exclusion.2 6 Under the methodology developed here, however,
that result would not occur. Because only commercial transfers of human
body materials are deemed to involve "property," no property would be
involved in a kidney donation. Thus, no gift tax liability would arise when
the potentially life-saving gift of a kidney is made.
However, a further consequence of this principle is that no charitable
donation deduction is available if, instead of giving the kidney to an
individual, the donor gave it to a charitable organization. Since a charitable
donation deduction is only available for gratuitous transfers of property to a
qualified charitable organization, 6 and the very involvement in a
gratuitous transfer means the kidney is not property, the transfer would be a
nonevent from a tax perspective.
E. Implementing the Framework
Courts and the Service should look to these three principles in
determining the appropriate tax treatment of the transfers of human body
materials. By aligning the tax treatment with broader cultural and legal
Moreover,
frameworks, the tax system's legitimacy is bolstered.
implementation of these principles would allow taxpayers to understand
when and how they have reporting obligations, increasing their compliance,
and limiting their costs in doing so.
To provide further clarity, the Service should issue a new revenue
ruling overturning Revenue Ruling 162 263 that recognizes that excised body
materials are properly understood, and subject to tax, as property once
entered into the stream of commerce. In addition, the Treasury Department
should issue regulations that track the principles set forth here. Moreover,
Form 706, United States Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax

26 1. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing gift tax provisions).
262. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing "property"
requirement).
263. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing Revenue Ruling 162).
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Return, should be revised to include a specific question about proceeds
received from the sale of any of the decedent's body materials.
As previously indicated, there is no need for-and little likelihood
of-comprehensive legislation in this area. In time, however, Congress
should adopt new Code provisions that provide for the appropriate gift and
estate tax exemptions for human body materials. To this end, a provision
excluding gifts of human body materials from taxation under Code § 2501
should be enacted. 264 In addition, Congress should, in due time, enact a
provision clarifying that the value of a cadaver is includable in a decedent's
gross estate only to the extent it, or any of its materials, is transferred
commercially. This approach would bring clarity to a recurring set of
issues that is currently muddied, in a way that best integrates both our more
general understandings of human bodies and current tax law.
VI. Conclusion
Transfers of human body materials have become increasingly
common. 25However,
an understanding of the appropriate tax treatment of
these transactions has not developed in pace. Instead, an amalgamation of
imprecise statutory provisions, outdated and contradictory I.R.S. issuances,
and narrowly written court decisions make tax planning and compliance in
this area difficult at best. Recognizing that the context in which transfers of
human body materials are made determines whether the materials are
properly characterized as property for tax purposes would be consistent
with our evolving legal and cultural understandings of human bodies and
provide clarity to this currently muddied area.
So what are we after all? Laborers, incurring both ordinary income
and payroll taxes on compensation for our services? Factories, producing
ordinary income property that is subject to transfer taxes and resulting, at
times, in payroll taxes being due? Or a compilation of spare parts, held for
investment until the time to sell is ripe? With modern technology, we have
become all three.

264. Such a provision could be added to Code § 2503, which provides exclusions from
gifts more generally. See I.R.C. § 2503 (2006) (providing exclusions for an annual amount,
direct payments for educational or medical expenses, and waiver of certain pension rights).
265. See supra notes 1-6 (providing examples of common transfers of human body
materials).
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